Articles in the Family Law category - Page 9 of 14

***NOTE: After the publication of this blog, the statute dealing with parenting coordinators was extensively amended. See S.L. 2019-172, effective October 1, 2019.

A few weeks ago, I posted blog about Parenting Coordinators (“PCs”) in Child Custody Cases and noted the ambiguity concerning the court’s authority to respond when a PC requests a hearing pursuant to GS 50-97 and identifies changes that need to be made to the existing custody order. Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals provided more guidance on this issue. In Tankala v. Pithavadian, NC App (July 19, 2016), the court held that the strict limitation on a court’s authority to “tweak” custody orders – see Blog “No ‘tweaking’ of Custody Orders Allowed – does not necessarily mean the court cannot address problems identified by a PC.

“We are not criminal defense lawyers. We are civil rights lawyers because being a criminal defense lawyer is kind of limiting”. (Alex Charns, Attorney, Annual Contractor and Assigned Counsel Training, UNC School of Government June 2016).

Considering all the many issues clients present with, referring to ourselves as only a specific type of attorney, such as a juvenile or family law attorney, does seem limiting. Representing people in any area of law requires more of attorneys, especially as they begin to address the multitude of social, health, and economic challenges their clients face.

READ POST "You Need to Know More Than Just the Law (August 17, 2016)"

Anyone who works with equitable distribution knows that the date of separation is a critical fact that must be established before anything else can be done in the case because it is the date used to define and value the marital estate. The date of separation should be established before the parties spend time and money engaging in the discovery process and definitely must be established before the court begins the process of classifying and valuing marital and divisible property.

So what is the relationship between a date of separation found as a fact in an absolute divorce judgment and the date of separation in the equitable distribution case? If the parties have obtained an absolute divorce and that judgment contains a date of separation, is that date binding on the equitable distribution case? Can one of the parties argue in the ED case that a different date was the actual date of separation?

READ POST "Equitable Distribution: Can we use the date of separation from the divorce judgment? (August 5, 2016)"

It is now well established that a parent has a constitutional right to exclusive care, custody and control of his or her child. This constitutional right protects a parent against claims for custody by non-parents. A court cannot apply the best interest of the child test to determine whether a non-parent should have custody of a child unless the court first concludes that the parent has waived her constitutional right to exclusive custody. A parent waives her constitutional right by being unfit, neglecting the welfare of the child, or by conduct otherwise inconsistent with the parent’s protected status. There is no precise definition of conduct inconsistent with protected status and our appellate courts have provided no comprehensive list of actions that will result in a parent’s loss of constitutional rights. Instead, whether a parent’s conduct has been inconsistent with protected status is an issue that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The non-parent seeking custody has the burden of proving the parent’s inconsistent conduct by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. For more detail on this law, see Family Law Bulletin, Third Party Custody and Visitation Actions.

What if a parent signs a consent custody order that grants custody rights to a non-parent third party? Does the parent lose the ability to assert her constitutional right to custody in subsequent custody proceedings? For example, if a parent agrees to a court order granting custody to grandmother, does the parent have the constitutional right to regain custody from grandmother in the future? Or, if another non-parent wants custody or visitation after parent has entered into a consent custody order with grandmother, does the other non-parent still need to prove parent has waived her constitutional right to custody and, if so, can the non-parent rely on the fact that parent voluntarily gave custody to the grandmother to establish that the parent acted inconsistent with her protected status?

READ POST "Third Party Custody: Does a parent lose constitutionally protected status by signing a consent custody order granting custody rights to a non-parent? (July 15, 2016)"

***NOTE: After the publication of this blog, the statute dealing with parenting coordinators was extensively amended. See S.L. 2019-172, effective October 1, 2019.

Unfortunately, the entry of a custody order does not always stop conflict between parents. Anyone working in family law knows that there are cases where, no matter how much effort and skill goes into creating the parenting plan, the parties will continue to come back to court because of the inability of one parent or both to stop fighting.

Recognizing that on-going litigation is bad for families, the General Assembly in 2005 enacted Article 5 of Chapter 50, GS 50-90 through 50-100, to authorize the appointment of a Parenting Coordinator (“PC”) in custody cases determined to be ‘high-conflict’. The hope is that the PC can help parents reduce their need to return to court.

My last blog post discussed the loss of trial court jurisdiction following an appeal. But the court of appeals has held that only appropriate appeals remove jurisdiction from the trial court. If a party appeals an order that is not immediately appealable, the trial court is not divested of jurisdiction and can proceed with the merits of the case, even if the merits involve the issues on appeal. See T&T Development Co., Inc. v. Southern National Bank, 125 N.C. App. 600 (1997)(appeal of decision on a motion in limine did not deprive court of jurisdiction); Harris v. Harris, 58 N.C. App. 175, rev’d on other grounds, 307 N.C. 684 (1983)(appeal of an interlocutory order in a separation agreement case did not deprive court of jurisdiction).

Generally speaking, a party has the right to appeal only a final judgment. However, there are times that an interlocutory order is appropriate. So what should the court do when a party appeals an order that clearly is not a final judgment, such as a temporary custody order or a PSS order or an interim distribution in an ED case? When is the interlocutory appeal appropriate?

In Ponder v. Ponder, NC App (May 3, 2016), the trial court conducted a lengthy hearing on plaintiff’s motion to renew a DVPO. Realizing the order needed numerous findings of fact to resolve the issues litigated but wanting to give plaintiff immediate protection, the trial court entered a renewal order with no findings of fact on AOC Form CV-314 and informed the parties that a more detailed supplemental order would replace the form order as soon as the court had time to complete it. Following entry of the form order, defendant appealed. The trial court then entered the supplemental order with extensive findings of fact only to have the court of appeals hold that both the form and the supplemental orders were void ab initio. The form order was void for a lack of findings and the supplemental order was void because it was entered after appeal was taken.

North Carolina law long has provided that court-ordered alimony terminates upon the death of either the supporting or dependent spouse and upon the remarriage of the dependent spouse. Since 1995, the law provides that even if the dependent spouse does not remarry, alimony also will terminate if the receiver engages in cohabitation. Our appellate courts have struggled to provide clear guidance regarding how to determine when a relationship amounts to cohabitation. Last December, in Setzler v. Setzler, 781 SE2d 64 (NC App., 2015), the court of appeals told us that the primary purpose of the cohabitation rule is to discourage “bad faith” decisions not to remarry and provided the clearest statement to date that cohabitation is proven by showing a relationship that provides economic benefits to the dependent spouse similar to those that would be provided by marriage.

READ POST "Alimony: Cohabitation is All About Money After All (May 27, 2016)"

The NC Child Support Guidelines provide that the term gross income “includes income from any source” and the Court of Appeal s has held repeatedly that the term should be construed very broadly. See e.g. Spicer v. Spicer, 168 NC App 283 (2005)(even the pain and suffering component of a personal injury settlement is income) and Moore v. Onafowora, 208 NC App 674 (2010)(bonuses received on a regular basis are included as recurring income). Unlike many other states, the NC Guidelines even count nonrecurring and one-time lump sum payments as income.

In an unpublished opinion issued last week, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed a line of cases holding that gifts and ‘maintenance’ received from third parties also must be included as income. In Cumberland County v. Cheeks, May 3, 2016, the Court of Appeals held that BAH (Basic Allowance for Housing) payments received by military personnel who do not live in government housing must be counted as income because the payments offset the living expenses of the service member.

READ POST "Child Support: Maintenance and Gifts Are Actual Income?? (May 13, 2016)"

Absolute divorce trials seldom, if ever, involve any sort of courtroom drama. Most of the time, these ‘trials’ involve one party coming to court to testify for less than 5 minutes or the attorney of one party coming to court to hand up a summary judgment for the judge to sign. Most requests for divorce are not contested – in large part because there generally are no defenses to divorce other than the failure to live separate and apart for one year.

So it is no wonder that some districts have decided to take the process of entering summary judgment divorce out of the courtroom. To save valuable court time, some districts have decided to adopt the practice of having judges enter summary judgment divorces after reviewing the pleadings in chambers. Notices are sent to the non-moving party stating that the summary judgment will be entered by the court on a specific date or at some point during a specific week. No actual hearing is held in the courtroom on the motion for summary judgment.

Is this okay?

READ POST "Does Summary Judgment Divorce Require a Hearing? (May 6, 2016)"