Articles in the Family Law category - Page 11 of 14

In a recent post, I wrote about requiring surrender of firearms in a DVPO. The court of appeals issued on opinion on Tuesday this week discussing when the court can order return of those firearms. In Underwood v. Hudson, the court reversed a trial court order denying return of weapons after the appellate court concluded defendant was not subject to the lifetime ban on possession which arises when a person is convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”

Chapter 50B requires that all civil domestic violence protective orders be of limited duration. GS 50B-3(b). However, that statute also allows the court to extend the life of a DVPO by renewing it at the request of the aggrieved party. Is a court required to renew the DVPO when requested? Is there a limit on the number of times an order can be renewed? Can a court change the terms of the order when it is renewed?  Unfortunately, Chapter 50B provides very little guidance on these and other issues that arise regarding the renewal process.

READ POST "Renewal of a DVPO (December 4, 2015)"

Because the marital estate ‘freezes’ on the date of separation, see Becker v. Becker, 88 NC App 606 (1988), an increase or decrease in the value of marital property occurring after the date of separation, or income received from marital property after the date of separation, is not included in the marital estate. The category of divisible property was created to allow a court to distribute these postseparation assets along with the marital property. If the change in value or the income is classified as divisible, it can be distributed. If it is not divisible property, the court can do nothing more than consider the income or change in value as a distribution factor.

READ POST "Equitable Distribution: LLCs and Divisible Property (November 13, 2015)"

The General Assembly has made a statement regarding the allocation of parenting rights and responsibilities in child custody proceedings. Without changing the law that custody orders should promote the best interests of the child, legislators enacted a statement of public policy designed to “promote the encouragement of parenting time with children by both parents.”

We have Chapter 50B authorizing civil domestic violence protective orders to protect victims of domestic violence and Chapter 50C authorizing civil no-contact orders to protect victims of sexual misconduct and stalking who do not have the personal relationship with the perpetrator required for a 50B DVPO. Effective October 1, 2015, we now also have Chapter 50D authorizing permanent, non-expiring civil no-contact orders to provide additional protection to victims of sexual violence.

In my last post, Imputing Income: Voluntary Unemployment is Not Enough, I wrote about the bad faith rule; the long-established rule that child support and alimony orders must be based on the actual present income of the parties unless there is cause to impute income. When income is imputed, a support order is based on earning capacity rather than actual income. The bad faith rule provides that earning capacity can be used only when a party is intentionally depressing actual income in deliberate disregard of a support obligation.

So what findings of fact are sufficient to establish bad faith?

Beware. A child support or alimony order should never contain the word “capacity” or the words “ability to earn” unless it also contains the words “bad faith.”

Maybe that statement is a little extreme, but it is intended to make a point. Alimony and child support obligations must be determined based on actual present income. Earning capacity rather than actual income can be used only when a party is intentionally depressing actual income in deliberate disregard of a support obligation. In other words, it is not appropriate for an order to be based on what a person should be earning- or on minimum wage – rather than on what that person actually is earning unless evidence shows the party is acting in bad faith and the court actually includes that conclusion of law in the order.

READ POST "Imputing Income: Voluntary Unemployment is Not Enough (September 18, 2015)"

All civil child support orders must order the child’s parent or other responsible party to provide health insurance for the child if it is available at a reasonable cost. GS 50-13.11(a1). If coverage is not available at a reasonable cost when the support order is entered, the court must order that health insurance be obtained when it becomes available at a reasonable cost. Recent legislation changes how we determine whether insurance is available at a reasonable cost and the 2015 Child Support Guidelines have been amended to reflect the change.

READ POST "Child Support: When is Health Insurance Available at a Reasonable Cost? (September 11, 2015)"

In Stancill v. Stancill, 773 SE2d 890 (NC App, June 16, 2015), the court of appeals held that a hearing on a request for an ex parte DVPO pursuant to […]

This Post was written by Professor Michael Crowell, UNC School of Government.

The question about fines for civil contempt is now resolved. Just over a year after the court of appeals allowed the use of a fine for civil contempt the General Assembly stepped in to say no, fines are not allowed for civil contempt, the only sanction is confinement until the person complies with the court order. In doing so, the legislature restored the law to what most thought it was before the appellate court ruling.

READ POST "NO FINES FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT (August 21, 2015)"