Articles in the Appeals category

The right to appeal an order in a delinquency matter is established in G.S. 7B-2602 (Right to appeal) and G.S. 7B-2603 (Right to appeal transfer decision). These statutes do not identify every order that is entered in a delinquency action. Instead, there is a right to appeal after entry of specified final orders and any order transferring jurisdiction to superior court for trial as an adult. This post explains when there is a statutory right to appeal an order in a delinquency matter, who has the right to appeal, and restrictions on juvenile court jurisdiction while an appeal is pending.

To end the week, I’ll point out three recent Court of Appeals opinions that remind us that a Rule 59 (“new trial”) motion will not toll an appeal period if the motion does not actually seek proper Rule 59 relief.  If, for example, the motion does not provide proper notice of the grounds for relief, or if it is being used merely as a general “motion for reconsideration,” it may not be considered “proper.”  As I’ve discussed in previous posts (here and here), North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 59 permits a trial judge to order a new trial (or, through Rule 59(e), amendment of judgment) for a number of reasons, including prejudicial irregularity, jury misconduct, newly-discovered evidence, insufficient evidence to justify the verdict, prejudicial error of law, and other bases.  A proper Rule 59 motion tolls the period for appeal of the underlying judgment. N.C. R. App. P. 3(c)(3); G.S. 1-279.1.  But if a court determines that Rule 59 was not the appropriate vehicle for remedy sought, the appeal period will not have been tolled. These three recent published opinions are our newest examples of this outcome:

In a prior post, I discussed whether North Carolina’s Rule of Civil Procedure 59—the “new trial” rule—could be used to seek relief from final judgments not resulting from a jury or non-jury trial.  That post focused on other types of final, appealable judgments, such as summary judgment orders and default judgments.  I concluded that North Carolina case law is not crystal clear on the question, but that the recent case of Bodie Island Beach Club Ass’n, Inc. v. Wray, 215 N.C. App. 283 (2011), indicates that filing Rule 59 motions for relief from these types of judgments could imperil an appeal.  Proper Rule 59 motions toll the appeal period for the underlying judgment pending disposition of the motion.  See N.C. R. App. P. 3(c)(3).  If the basis for the Rule 59 motion is not proper, the appeal period will not have been tolled.

Yesterday the Court of Appeals again addressed Rule 59’s applicability to orders other than trial judgments, but this time analyzed a pretrial, interlocutory order.  In Tetra Tech Tesoro, Inc. v. JAAAT Tech. Services, LLC, a construction dispute, a subcontractor sued a contractor for unpaid work.  The trial judge granted the subcontractor a preliminary injunction requiring the contractor

Even if you don’t know much about North Carolina’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, you probably know this:  There’s a 30-day time frame in which to appeal a civil judgment, and this deadline is jurisdictional—an untimely notice of appeal “mandates dismissal” of the appeal.  E.g., Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 156 (2000).  In other words, Thou Shalt Not Miss Thy Appeal Deadline.  Naturally, then, a would-be appellant needs to know when the 30-day appeal period begins and ends.

The general time requirement is set out in Rule 3(c)(1), which makes clear that the notice of appeal must be filed and served within 30 days after entry of judgment as long as “the party has been served with a copy of the judgment within the three-day period prescribed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.”  (Served pursuant to Rule 5 within three days of entry of judgment.)  Under Rule 3(c)(2), however, when the party is not served within that three day period, the notice of appeal must be filed and served within 30 days “after service upon the party of a copy of the judgment.”

By the plain language of Rule 3(c)(2), a party not served within three days would be led to think that its 30-day appeal clock starts when service is made.  Not so fast.  In a series of fairly recent opinions, the Court of Appeals has held that, if the appellant had some sort of actual notice of the judgment during those three days after its entry, Rule 3(c)(2) does not apply.  If there was actual notice, the 30 days instead began to run upon entry of judgment.  Here, in brief, are the opinions: