Articles related to subject matter jurisdiction

A child support order entered by a court in a jurisdiction other than North Carolina must be registered in North Carolina pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, N.C. […]

Consider a custody action brought by a grandparent against the mother of a child. Grandmother is seeking primary custody, arguing that mother is unfit and has waived her constitutional right […]

The Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) governs a state’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear child custody cases, including abuse, neglect, dependency (A/N/D), and termination of parent rights (TPR). See G.S. 50A-102(4); 50A-106. Without following the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJEA, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Any orders entered when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction are void ab initio. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588 (2006). I receive numerous inquiries about the UCCJEA in A/N/D cases. A common question involves North Carolina’s use of temporary emergency jurisdiction and whether it ever becomes initial custody jurisdiction when North Carolina becomes the juvenile’s “home state” after the A/N/D petition has been filed in district court. Earlier this month, the court of appeals answered this question when it published In re N.B., ___ N.C. App. ___ (July 5, 2023). This blog serves as a follow up to my previous blog post about temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

In the last two years, the North Carolina Supreme Court has published two opinions that answer questions raised about whether a North Carolina district court has personal and/or subject matter jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of a parent who lives outside of North Carolina. Both opinions are cases of first impression. Both opinions held that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the respondent parent. One opinion held the district court also had subject matter jurisdiction in the TPR action. Both opinions affirmed the challenged TPR orders. Both opinions overturn previous court of appeals opinions on the issues raised. Here’s what you need to know.

Suppose mother files an action for custody when North Carolina is the home state of the child and mother and father both reside in North Carolina. Temporary orders are entered […]

North Carolina adoption laws are codified in G.S. Chapter 48. I find it to be one of the more difficult Chapters to navigate because it consists of interrelated Articles and Parts. As you get familiar with the Chapter, the procedures and requirements become less challenging to piece together. It is imperative to know these procedures because “the law governing adoptions in North Carolina is wholly statutory.” Boseman v. Jarrell, 364 N.C. 537, 542 (2010).

Under North Carolina adoption laws, before an adoption of an unemancipated minor may be granted, certain consents must be obtained. See G.S. 48-3-601 through -603. One required consent is from the minor adoptee if they are 12 years old or older. G.S. 48-3-601(1). However, that minor’s consent may be waived when the court issues an order based upon a finding that it is not in the minor’s best interests to require their consent. G.S. 48-3-603(b)(2).

What court has jurisdiction to enter the order waiving the minor adoptee’s consent?

The question is circulating due to some recent North Carolina Supreme Court opinions involving appeals of termination of parental rights (TPR) orders. The facts of the opinions indicate the district court in the TPR action waived the juvenile’s consent to the adoption. The issue of whether the district court in a TPR proceeding has subject matter jurisdiction to waive the juvenile’s consent does not appear to have been raised before or decided by the Supreme Court. Instead, the minor’s waiver of consent is discussed by the Supreme Court in its review of the facts when analyzing a challenge to the district court’s determination that the TPR is in the juvenile’s best interests. The factual summaries in the Supreme Court TPR opinions made me sit up in my chair, take notice, and ask the questions in this post.

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)* is a complex federal law that applies to abuse, neglect, or dependency (A/N/D); termination of parental rights (TPR); and adoption proceedings. One of the purposes of ICWA is to provide special protections to federally recognized Indian tribes and the tribes’ children and families. See 25 U.S.C. 1901‒1902.

Subject matter jurisdiction between tribal courts and state courts is governed by ICWA when an “Indian child” is the subject of the A/N/D, TPR, or adoption proceeding. When any of the criteria of 25 U.S.C. 1911(a) are met, the tribal court has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. When that criteria do not exist, ICWA allows for concurrent jurisdiction between state and tribal courts. See 25 U.S.C. 1911(b), (c). The N.C. Court of Appeals (COA) recently published two opinions addressing subject matter jurisdiction under ICWA. In one case, the COA held that the N.C. court had jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding that involved two Indian children. In the other case, the COA remanded for further proceedings in the trial court in part to ensure the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in the A/N/D action when it was uncertain whether the child was an “Indian child.”

A takeaway from these cases is that the N.C. court is not automatically divested of subject matter jurisdiction when an Indian child is the subject of the proceeding. But, how does the N.C. court know if it has subject matter jurisdiction?

In 2016, the court of appeals held that a voluntary support agreement that modified an existing child support order was void because neither party filed a motion to modify as required by GS 50-13.7. Catawba County ex. Rel. Rackley, 784 SE2d 620 (N.C. App. 2016). On September 29, 2017, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the order was not void.

This is important. Among other things, this decision means that if a court accepts a consent order for modification and the requirements of GS 50-13.7 have not been met, the consent order nevertheless is valid and enforceable. However, GS 50-13.7 still requires that a motion be filed and that the court conclude there has been a substantial change in circumstances before modifying a child support or a child custody order can be modified. The failure to comply with the statute is legal error that will support reversal by the court of appeals if there is a direct appeal.

*SINCE THIS POST WAS PUBLISHED, THE N.C. SUPREME COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DISCUSSED BELOW. A new blog post discussing the NC Supreme Court decision can be read here.

Earlier this year, the North Carolina Court of Appeals published In re A.P., 800 S.E.2d 77 (2017), which held that the county DSS that had an open child protective case did not have standing to file a neglect and dependency petition. As a result, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action, and the adjudication and disposition orders were vacated. Since In re A.P. was decided, there are lots of questions about when a county DSS has standing to file an abuse, neglect, or dependency (A/N/D) petition and what happens in conflict of interest cases requiring a case to be transferred to a different county DSS.

Update: On June 5, 2017, the NC Supreme Court allowed the state’s motion for a temporary stay of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in T.K., which indicates that further appellate […]