Articles related to delinquent juvenile - Page 2 of 3

On May 15, 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court granted due process rights to children in the landmark case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The case involved 15-year-old Gerald Gault, who was taken into police custody without notice to his parents, held for four days, and committed to a juvenile facility for a maximum of six years for making a prank phone call to his neighbor. He received no prior notice of the charges and was adjudicated delinquent following an informal hearing with a judge without any witnesses or representation by counsel. His case would spark outrage today but was the norm for juvenile proceedings at the time. When the Supreme Court reversed Gault’s adjudication, it transformed the nature of juvenile court by defining basic requirements of due process that now apply to all delinquency hearings. These rights include:

• the right to notice of the charges;
• the right to an attorney;
• the right to remain silent; and
• the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

While this decision marked a watershed moment in children’s rights, the language of the Court was not absolute. The Supreme Court did not extend these rights to all juveniles. Gault applies only to juveniles whose adjudication of delinquency may result in commitment to a state institution, which excludes undisciplined juveniles. The Court also limited its holding to the adjudicatory stage, leaving states open to define due process in other stages of juvenile proceedings (i.e., pre-adjudication, disposition, and post-disposition). Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. As a result, the decision did not completely change the legal landscape but left a legal patchwork among state jurisdictions that continues today. This post is the first in a series of posts that will discuss Gault’s impact on juvenile delinquency proceedings in NC and whether Gault’s promise of due process rights for children has been fully achieved.

Can a district court judge impose a consecutive term of commitment upon a delinquent juvenile who is already committed to a youth development center (YDC)? Until yesterday, when I had to research this question for a client, I assumed that consecutive terms of confinement applied only to adult criminal sentences under G.S. 15A-1354 but not to juvenile dispositions. Juveniles who are long term committed to juvenile facilities generally are placed there indefinitely and must work towards release by completing appropriate treatment and services designed to correct their behavior. Typically, there is no predetermined end date to the commitment (like a criminal sentence) which is why I assumed that juveniles could not receive consecutive terms. I was surprised to learn that my assumption was wrong when I found what appears to be the only NC appellate decision on the issue. See Matter of Thompson, 74 N.C. App. 329, 330 (1985). Although Thompson holds that a court may impose a consecutive commitment term, there are a couple reasons why courts may choose not to do so in a delinquency case.

Every other year the School of Government and Office of Indigent Defense Services hold a multi-day skills training for juvenile defenders in North Carolina. The first day of this year’s intensive training was held at the Guilford County Juvenile Detention Center in Greensboro, NC. The juvenile defenders first heard sessions on adolescent brain development by Dr. Ayesha Chaudhary, Forensic Psychiatrist at Duke University, and detention advocacy by Mitch Feld, Director of Children’s Defense at the Council for Children’s Rights. This set the stage for the tour of the facility and conversations with the youth.

Unless the court has specified a shorter term, a juvenile’s initial term of probation expires after one year, if not extended by the court. Extensions of probation are governed by G.S. 7B-2510(c), which was amended by HB 879 effective December 1, 2015. The statute now provides that “[p]rior to expiration of an order of probation, the court may extend it for an additional period of one year after notice and a hearing, if the court finds that the extension is necessary to protect the community or to safeguard the welfare of the juvenile.” Since December, I’ve received numerous questions about the new notice requirement, which apparently is being interpreted in many different ways.  To help clarify this question and other issues related to extensions of probation, here’s a brief summary of FAQ’s about the procedure for extending a juvenile’s probation.

When a juvenile runs from North Carolina to another state or to North Carolina from another state, interstate procedures apply to facilitate the juvenile’s safe return to his or her home state. Recently, law enforcement officials in multiple North Carolina counties have encountered out-of-state runaways and yesterday, this topic appeared on one of the School of Government monitored listservs. So, it seems like a good time to review what the Interstate Compact for Juveniles says about the legal process for returning these children to their homes.

Nearly five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided J.D.B. v. North Carolina, a case arising from the police interrogation of a middle school student in Chapel Hill. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that police officers must consider a juvenile’s age when determining whether they must read juveniles their Miranda rights before questioning them. The ruling represents a major shift in Miranda jurisprudence by establishing a different standard for evaluating police interrogations of juveniles – the reasonable child standard. In the years since J.D.B., however, lower courts have not clearly defined how the reasonable child standard impacts the assessment of whether a juvenile was “in custody.” The application of this new standard also raises questions about how North Carolina courts evaluate custody determinations in the school setting. These and other issues are addressed in detail in “Applying the Reasonable Child Standard to Juvenile Interrogations After J.D.B. v. North Carolina” (No. 2016/01).

Several years ago when I was an appellate attorney for the State, I filed a cert petition seeking appellate review of a court order granting a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to set aside an adjudication of delinquency for first degree sex offense. The court found that the allegations were proven beyond a reasonable doubt but then allowed the juvenile’s Rule 60(b) motion because the offense (fellatio) was four years old, it was not committed in a violent manner, the juvenile showed no risk of reoffending, and labeling the juvenile as a sex offender would do him more harm than good. Based on these findings, the court concluded that “extraordinary circumstances” existed and that justice required granting the juvenile’s motion. The Court of Appeals declined to review the order and still hasn’t addressed whether Rule 60(b) applies to delinquency cases.

District court judges throughout the state disagree on the answer (which I discovered during a lively debate in my first juvenile delinquency course at the School of Government). There is no clear answer, but appellate cases suggest that Rule 60(b) does apply. However, it may not authorize setting aside an adjudication order, as described above. Here’s why.

READ POST "Obtaining Relief from an Adjudication of Delinquency: Does Rule 60 Apply? (January 27, 2016)"

In a prior post, I wrote about SB 331, which proposed several changes to the delinquency subchapter of the Juvenile Code. That bill didn’t make it. Instead, it became HB […]

*** Note, since this blog post was published, the General Assembly enacted S.L. 2015-58, which replaces SB 331. For more information, see this blog post on juvenile code reform legislation.

Subchapter II of the North Carolina Juvenile Code has seen few changes, since the Juvenile Code was rewritten in 1998. However, several bills are currently pending that suggest change may be coming. Some of these pending bills seek to clarify existing statutory procedures or create new procedures to provide guidance where the Juvenile Code is currently silent. However, two of the proposed changes are intended to reverse recent appellate court decisions interpreting the Juvenile Code. This list, although not exhaustive, describes pending bills that are likely to be of interest to juvenile court officials.

Juveniles, like adults, may be held in contempt for disrespecting the court or interfering with the proper administration of justice. Consider the actions of the juveniles in the following cases: (1) Evan, age 14, was adjudicated delinquent for simple possession of marijuana. At the disposition hearing, the judge asked Evan, “Where do you get your marijuana?” and he refused to answer. Although the judge repeated this question several times, he still refused to answer. (2) Kim, age 15, was adjudicated as an undisciplined juvenile for habitual, unlawful absences from school. The terms of her protective supervision order required her to attend school every day, but she has repeatedly skipped school, since the disposition hearing. May either juvenile be held in contempt? The short answer is yes.