Articles in the Small Claims Law category - Page 6 of 7

It’s not hard to understand why every state in the United States offers its residents a small claims court. Small claims courts offer two advantages increasingly hard to come by in the court system: they’re cheap, and they’re fast. In 2009 the North Carolina General Assembly took steps to ensure that small claims cases aren’t decided too fast by enacting minimum notice requirements.  Prior to this legislation, a small claims defendant might be served Monday evening for a trial held Tuesday morning. The legislation enacted two separate amendments establishing different minimum notice requirements for (1) summary ejectment actions, and (2) all other small claims cases.  As we shall see, despite their differences, the guiding principles for magistrates implementing the legislation are the same for both types of lawsuits.

In my most recent post, G.S. 42-3: The Landlord’s Life Preserver, I discussed summary ejectment based on the implied forfeiture provision set out in that statute. Confusion about when ejectment may be obtained on this ground, as distinguished from ejectment based on an explicit forfeiture provision in the lease itself, easily ranks #1 on my list of Most Common Summary Ejectment Errors. At the end of my previous post, I promised to next address tender as a defense to an action for summary ejectment. It comes as no surprise that the majority of North Carolina appellate cases involving tender present this same error in a different context. As is so often true in navigating the law of summary ejectment, correct identification of the ground for relief is the first step that renders subsequent steps simple. As we shall see, it is only when the landlord is reaching for the G.S. 42-3 life preserver that tender has potential application to the case.

At common law a landlord confronted with a non-paying tenant had only one hope for regaining possession of rental property: a lease provision spelling out that the tenant’s default would trigger the landlord’s right to repossess the property (commonly referred to as a forfeiture clause). When the parties have agreed in advance to this consequence for failure to pay rent, an action for summary ejectment merely asks the court to enforce the agreement of the parties. The common law rule was that absent such agreement, the landlord was left to the unsatisfactory recourse of cutting his losses by terminating the lease as soon as possible and attempting to collect unpaid rent through an action for money owed — with all of the attendant problems associated with the collection of money judgments.

READ POST "G.S. 42-3: The Landlord’s Life Preserver (December 9, 2015)"

When a magistrate has heard evidence in a case and makes a decision based on that evidence, the formal document reflecting that decision is a judgment of the court. Form judgments for each kind of small claims case are provided by the AOC (designated as CVM forms), and they provide a valuable guide to the finding and conclusions required for a proper judgment. While the AOC forms are convenient, the law does not require their use, and some counties routinely utilize different forms. The AOC forms do reflect thoughtful decisions about what should be included in a judgment, however, and a small claims magistrate is advised to investigate further before deciding to routinely deviate from or ignore some portion of the judgment form.

For hundreds of years, the law has provided a procedure for landlords to obtain assistance from the justice system in ousting a tenant and taking back rental property. In North Carolina in the late 19^th Century, just as today, “proceedings in ejectment” were one of the most common types of civil cases filed. I recently spent some time reading many older landlord-tenant cases in an effort to trace the development of the law pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction in summary ejectment cases. I began with some reservations about the continued relevance of these cases. After all, North Carolina’s entire court system was revised – and the Rules of Civil Procedure adopted– after many of these cases were decided. Justices of the peace no longer hold court, and appeal from small claims court is to district—not superior—court today. What I found striking in doing this research was actually how little has changed. The questions in the late 1800s may have used different legal terminology, but would be familiar to any small claims magistrate. One of the most common issues, for example, was whether a seller/landlord could regain possession of property subject to a rent-to-own agreement by way of summary ejectment.  Another was whether a buyer by way of foreclosure could use summary ejectment to oust the former owner. What I found is that the rules governing jurisdiction in ejectment cases have remained remarkably consistent in application, although the underlying rationale for the rules has, from the beginning, been considerably more variable. This post attempts to summarize those procedural rules where they are clear. In my next post, I’ll discuss some troublesome areas in which clarity is lacking.

My last post discussed the clerk of court’s role in determining whether a case is eligible for small claims court under the terms of the chief district court judge’s order […]

When a litigant presents a complaint and asks that the case be heard in small claims court, a clerk has different responsibilities than when a plaintiff wishes to file any […]

In my last post, I outlined the most significant procedural differences between general civil actions and actions brought in small claims court, which are governed in large part by GS Ch. 7A, Art. 19. Overall, the procedure in small claims court is simpler, faster, and cheaper. The substantive rules and procedures for summary ejectment, the most common small claims action, are highly specialized and allow for even faster relief. Summary ejectment is a legal action brought by a landlord seeking to remove a breaching tenant from possession of rental property.  North Carolina joins a large number of states in offering landlords this carefully crafted remedy, which may at first appear unusual in its provision of frank preferential treatment to a particular group of litigants seeking a particular remedy.  The US Supreme Court approved such specialized treatment many years ago, however, pointing out that providing an expedited procedure for these cases makes sense in the larger context of laws prohibiting the common law practice of self-help eviction. “The objective of achieving rapid and peaceful settlement of possessory disputes between landlord and tenant has ample historical explanation and support. It is not beyond the State’s power to implement that purpose by enacting special provisions applicable only to possessory disputes between landlord and tenant.” Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72, 92 S. Ct. 862, 873, 31 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1972). In this blog entry, I’ll identify the most significant distinctions between the usual procedural rules applicable to small claims court and those applicable only to actions for summary ejectment.

READ POST "Special Rules for Summary Ejectment Actions (July 1, 2015)"

Every so often I get telephone calls from attorneys, fresh from a rare appearance in small claims court, calling to offer some helpful observations about the need for more and better training of small claims magistrates. I suspect that chief district court judges and clerks of superior court receive similar calls. While magistrates, like the rest of us, sometimes make mistakes, I’ve learned that it is often the attorney, rather than the magistrate, who is in error, for reasons that are entirely understandable. After all, attorneys share that fundamental rite of passage of having suffered through two agonizing (at least for some of us) semesters of law school mastering various aspects of the Rules of Civil Procedure. And Rule #1 (literally) assures us that “These rules shall govern the procedure in superior and district courts of the State of North Carolina in all actions and proceedings of a civil nature except when a differing procedure is prescribed by statute.” GS 1A-1, Rule 1. So what’s up with small claims?

North Carolina law permits summary ejectment from residential housing only for reasons specified in the statute. G.S. 42-25.6.  In Eastern Carolina Regional Housing Authority v. Lofton, 767 S.E.2d 63 (2014), the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided a case—and created new law – related to one of the most common grounds for summary ejectment: breach of a lease condition which, according to the lease itself, triggers the landlord’s right to declare the lease forfeited.

READ POST "Summary Ejectment & Unconscionability: When Breach of the Lease Is Not Enough (April 8, 2015)"