Articles in the Civil Law category - Page 4 of 5

In my last post, I outlined the most significant procedural differences between general civil actions and actions brought in small claims court, which are governed in large part by GS Ch. 7A, Art. 19. Overall, the procedure in small claims court is simpler, faster, and cheaper. The substantive rules and procedures for summary ejectment, the most common small claims action, are highly specialized and allow for even faster relief. Summary ejectment is a legal action brought by a landlord seeking to remove a breaching tenant from possession of rental property.  North Carolina joins a large number of states in offering landlords this carefully crafted remedy, which may at first appear unusual in its provision of frank preferential treatment to a particular group of litigants seeking a particular remedy.  The US Supreme Court approved such specialized treatment many years ago, however, pointing out that providing an expedited procedure for these cases makes sense in the larger context of laws prohibiting the common law practice of self-help eviction. “The objective of achieving rapid and peaceful settlement of possessory disputes between landlord and tenant has ample historical explanation and support. It is not beyond the State’s power to implement that purpose by enacting special provisions applicable only to possessory disputes between landlord and tenant.” Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72, 92 S. Ct. 862, 873, 31 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1972). In this blog entry, I’ll identify the most significant distinctions between the usual procedural rules applicable to small claims court and those applicable only to actions for summary ejectment.

READ POST "Special Rules for Summary Ejectment Actions (July 1, 2015)"

*This post was amended on January 29, 2016 to add Rule 45 (subpoena) and on February 22, 2017 to specifically reference Rule 12(b)(3)

Have you ever felt like you’re playing a game of one potato, two potato when figuring out if a Rule of Civil Procedure applies to your abuse, neglect, dependency, or termination of parental rights action? Let me provide you with a guide instead.

In my last post, No Default Judgment in Contempt, I wrote about the requirement that all contempt orders contain the conclusion that respondent acted willfully when committing the act that is the basis for contempt. Of course, that conclusion must be supported by findings of fact, which in turn must be based on evidence.

So what findings are sufficient to support the required conclusion when contempt is based on the failure to pay money, such as child support?

READ POST "Contempt: Establishing Ability to Pay (May 8, 2015)"

Even when contempt is based upon the failure to pay child support, the contempt order must contain the conclusion of law that respondent willfully violated the court order. That conclusion must be supported by findings of fact showing respondent actually has/had the ability to comply or to take reasonable steps to comply and deliberately failed to do so. Those findings of fact must be based on evidence.

In other words, a contempt order cannot be entered by default – a court cannot assume a respondent has the ability to comply simply because the respondent fails to prove he/she does not have the ability to comply.

Chapter 50B expressly authorizes entry of consent DVPOs, GS 50B-1(c), and many cases are resolved in this way. Overall, this is a good thing because consent orders:

• Spare both parties, who often are appearing pro se, the stress and uncertainty of a trial;
• Allow the parties to create orders that will best meet their specific needs; and
• Conserve valuable court time.

It is not uncommon for a defendant to be willing to agree to the entry of an order but not willing to agree that the specific acts alleged in the complaint actually occurred.  Can a DVPO be entered without the specifics?

North Carolina law permits summary ejectment from residential housing only for reasons specified in the statute. G.S. 42-25.6.  In Eastern Carolina Regional Housing Authority v. Lofton, 767 S.E.2d 63 (2014), the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided a case—and created new law – related to one of the most common grounds for summary ejectment: breach of a lease condition which, according to the lease itself, triggers the landlord’s right to declare the lease forfeited.

READ POST "Summary Ejectment & Unconscionability: When Breach of the Lease Is Not Enough (April 8, 2015)"

Juveniles, like adults, may be held in contempt for disrespecting the court or interfering with the proper administration of justice. Consider the actions of the juveniles in the following cases: (1) Evan, age 14, was adjudicated delinquent for simple possession of marijuana. At the disposition hearing, the judge asked Evan, “Where do you get your marijuana?” and he refused to answer. Although the judge repeated this question several times, he still refused to answer. (2) Kim, age 15, was adjudicated as an undisciplined juvenile for habitual, unlawful absences from school. The terms of her protective supervision order required her to attend school every day, but she has repeatedly skipped school, since the disposition hearing. May either juvenile be held in contempt? The short answer is yes.

It is not uncommon for persons under 18 to commit acts of domestic violence or need protection from domestic violence. Common questions that arise include:

• Can a minor be a defendant in a 50B proceeding?
• If so, how is the child served and what happens when the child violates the DVPO?
• Can a minor be a plaintiff?
• Does a minor need to be a plaintiff to be protected by a DVPO?

This week the School of Government announced that it has made a free, PDF version of the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions available on the SOG Web site. All three […]

During deliberations in a motorcycle accident trial, the jury asks to view and discuss some exhibits in the jury room: a series of admitted photos depicting part of the accident scene. May the judge allow the jury to take the photos into the jury room? As with most things, it depends.

This question used to be governed by the “well-settled” rule in Nunnery v. Baucom, 135 N.C. App. 556 (1999), that “trial exhibits introduced into evidence may not be present in the jury room during deliberations unless both parties consent.” For civil cases, the “consent required” rule was replaced in October 2007 by G.S. 1-181.2, which governs both open-court and jury room evidence review. Although this statute is now a few years old, it is perhaps not as widely-known as it could be. For a recent case in point, see Redd v. Wilcohess, LLC, 745 S.E.2d 10 (N.C. App. 2013). So, here’s a review of the standards established by G.S. 1-181.2.