A Tale of Two Storage Units by Melanie Crenshaw

In March 2026, the court of appeals issued an opinion that involved property stored at a self-storage facility. Yurk v. Terra Center, LLC, __ N.C. App. __, 929 S.E.2d 371 (2026). This dispute over merchandise located at a self-storage facility lasted years and included claims for conversion, trespass to chattels, unfair and deceptive trade practices, violations of the Self-Storage Facility Act, civil trespass, and piercing the corporate veil. The opinion is an interesting review of tort claims that can also appear in small claims court although this case originated in superior court. This post will explore the elements of these claims and what the opinion says about the evidence required to prove them.

Whose stuff is it anyways?

To supplement the facts in the opinion, I reviewed the parties' appellate briefs. Jeffrey Yurk is a combat veteran who began a business, Group 504, LLC, to sell merchandise at military and law enforcement events across the country. In addition to the inventory of merchandise, Mr. Yurk also had two trailers associated with the business. His relationship with the defendant storage facility began when he rented two exterior spaces to park his trailers. Eventually, he needed interior spaces to store excess merchandise, and he entered into oral agreements with a former manager for two different units at the self-storage facility. After that manager was fired, another facility manager questioned Mr. Yurk about the storage units when she saw him at the facility because they did not appear on his account. He explained the verbal agreements he made with the discharged manager and his assumption that they were charged to his credit card, similar to how he paid for the exterior parking spaces.

Subsequently, the defendants took possession of the property in the storage units by overlocking them with the facility's own locks. The defendants argued that it was unclear who owned the property in the units because some of the boxes were marked Group 504, and they needed to preserve the property for whomever the rightful owner turned out to be. Following the defendants' refusal to return the property unless Mr. Yurk signed a liability release, he filed claims for conversion, trespass to chattels, unfair and deceptive trade practices (UDTP), violations of the Self-Storage Act, civil trespass, and piercing the corporate veil.

Claim-by-Claim

The trial court entered judgment for Mr. Yurk on the conversion, trespass to chattels, and UDTP claims but dismissed his Self-Storage Act, civil trespass, and veil piercing claims. Both parties appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment as to liability for conversion, trespass to chattels, and UDTP, but vacated and remanded parts of the judgment dealing with the award of treble damages and attorney's fees. Let's consider the claims on which Mr. Yurk prevailed.

Conversion

Conversion is a common law tort by which the defendant wrongfully interferes with the plaintiff's right of ownership. It is the only tort specifically identified on the small claim complaint form AOC-CVM-200, Complaint for Money Owed, and it arises when the plaintiff is seeking the fair market value for property wrongfully converted by the defendant. "Conversion is defined as: (1) the unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership; (2) over the goods or personal property; (3) of another; (4) to the exclusion of the rights of the true owner." Di Frega v. Pugliese, 164 N.C. App. 499, 509 (2004). To recover on a claim for conversion, the plaintiff must prove the following essential elements:

  1. Plaintiff is the owner of the personal property.
  2. Defendant wrongfully took or wrongfully retained the personal property after demand was made for its return, i.e., the defendant converted the property.

The defendants challenged Mr. Yurk's ownership of the property at issue in this case because the profits from the sale of it ran through the Group 504, LLC and Mr. Yurk referred to the merchandise as "our property" in some text messages. However, the court of appeals held that the trial court's finding that Mr. Yurk was the lawful owner of the property was supported by competent evidence. The evidence relied upon by the trial court included testimony from Mr. Yurk and his wife that purchases were made on Mr. Yurk's personal credit cards, credit card statements documenting the purchases, storage of the merchandise at his personal residences before moving it into the storage facility, and the defendant's own offer to return "Mr. Yurk's" property in exchange for a liability release.

The defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence because there was no corroboration from the seller of the merchandise. The court of appeals points out that, "[u]nder the bench-trial standard, our task is only to determine whether competent evidence supports the judge's findings; it does." Yurk v. Terra Center, LLC, __ N.C. App. __, 929 S.E.2d 371 (2026). Here, the judge found that the testimonial and documentary evidence about ownership was credible, and the court of appeals held that corroboration was not required by the case relied upon by the defendants. Magistrates presiding over small claims have to make these same credibility determinations every day and can be guided by the evidence in this case.

The defendants also argued they lacked notice of Mr. Yurk's ownership of the property. However, the trial record supported that Mr. Yurk had consistently asserted his ownership and no other person or entity ever claimed ownership.

As to the second element of conversion, the court of appeals held that the trial court's findings of fact supported the legal conclusion that the defendant wrongfully took and retained Mr. Yurk's property. The owner of the storage facility directed employees to overlock the units and to transfer the property to another facility. The property was moved twice. Further, the defendants retained the property through the trial and conditioned its return on the execution of a liability waiver.

Damages in a conversion action are the fair market value of the property at the time of conversion. In determining damages, the judicial official is faced with assessing the plaintiff's evidence as to the fair market value of the property. The party seeking to recover bears the burden of proving the amount of damages to a reasonable degree of certainty, but proof to an absolute mathematical certainty is not required. Lacey v. Kirk, 238 N.C. App. 376, 392-393 (2014). The opinion in Yurk is a good example of what evidence can be sufficient to establish value. The trial court relied on the defendants' itemized inventory for quantities and the plaintiff's opinion as the owner as to pricing. The pricing was based on resale prices for the inventory and his sales experience. The court held that the evidence was competent as to the value of the property.

Trespass to Chattels

Similar to conversion, the tort of trespass to chattels involves the interference with another's personal property. The deprivation of the plaintiff's property may not be as serious as that required for conversion. 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass § 14 (2026). To recover on a claim for trespass to chattels, the plaintiff must prove the following elements:

  1. Actual or constructive possession of the personal property by the plaintiff at the time of the trespass.
  2. An unauthorized or unlawful interference or dispossession of the property by the defendant.

"Actual possession consists of exercising dominion over, making ordinary use of, or taking the profits from the [property] in dispute." Fordham v. Eason, 351 N.C. 151, 155 (1999). "Constructive possession is a legal fiction existing when there is no actual possession, but there is title granting an immediate right to actual possession." Id. The defendants conceded that Mr. Yurk had constructive possession of the property at the time of the trespass. The same evidence that supports the second element of the conversion claim, also supports the second element of the trespass to chattels claim. The defendants dispossessed Mr. Yurk of the property by excluding him from accessing it for an extended period of time.

Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices

It is unlawful in North Carolina for businesses to engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices that affect commerce. G.S. 75-1.1. Judicial officials who preside over summary ejectment cases may be familiar with unfair or deceptive trade practice (UDTP) claims in the context of violations of the landlord's obligations under the Residential Rental Agreements Act, but the claim authorized by G.S. 75-16 can be brought by any person who has been injured by an unfair or deceptive trade practice. To recover on a claim for UDTP, the plaintiff must prove the following elements:

  1. The defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice.
  2. The act was in or affecting commerce
  3. The act proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff.

"An act is 'unfair' if it is 'immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers,' and it is 'deceptive' if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive." Yurk v. Terra Center, LLC, __ N.C. App. __, 929 S.E.2d 371, 379 (2026). In Yurk, the storage-facility owner ordered the property be taken and continued to withhold it from Mr. Yurk for more than three years. In analyzing the reasonableness of the defendant's actions in Yurk, the court focuses on the definition of unfair. Specifically, the court pointed out that conditioning of the return of the property on a release from liability and withholding the property for years was "an inequitable assertion of power and position" that rose to the level of oppressive and substantially injurious conduct. Id.

The remaining elements were also satisfied. The rental of self-storage spaces is a business activity that affects commerce. Mr. Yurk suffered prolonged deprivation of his property, diminished value of the property, and lost business sufficient to establish injury by the defendants' actions.  

What about a lien on the property or summary ejectment?

Based on the parties in the caption, I assumed it was a case involving a commercial landlord-tenant situation and the facility owner's lien on personal property stored at the storage facility. See G.S. Ch. 44A, Art. 4. The opinion in Yurk addresses my assumption that this was a commercial landlord-tenant situation whereby the storage-facility could claim a lien on the property stored at the facility. The answer: there was not competent evidence to prove that Mr. Yurk had a valid lease for the two storage units. The facility manager with whom Mr. Yurk originally dealt was later fired for crimes he allegedly committed while managing the facility. Although the opinion does not address the manager's alleged criminal activity, it likely contributed to the defendants' position and the trial court's finding that no valid lease existed.  

The owner of a self-service storage facility has a lien upon all personal property stored at the facility for rent, expenses necessary for the preservation of the property, and expenses reasonably incurred in the sale or disposition of the property if the occupant fails to pay rent. G.S. 44A-41. An owner of a self-storage facility is a commercial landlord who rents space. G.S. 44A-44.1. Among the defendants in this case is the owner of the storage facility where Mr. Yurk had placed his merchandise, but she denied the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and never asserted a lien on the property at issue. The defendants' position—and the one the court credited—was that no valid lease existed and no payment had been made for at least one of the units. Since Mr. Yurk did not have a leasehold interest and the defendant-owner did not assert a lien on the property, the trial court dismissed the Self-Storage Facility Act and civil trespass claims which the court of appeals affirmed.

Key Takeaways

  • In an action for conversion, the plaintiff can establish ownership through testimonial and documentary evidence that shows plaintiff was the purchaser of the property and exercised control over it.
  • In an action for trespass to chattels, the plaintiff can have either actual or constructive possession of the property.
  • The inequitable assertion of power and position is conduct that is actionable in a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices.  
  • Even though G.S. 44A-44.1 establishes that the owner of a self-storage facility is a commercial landlord, there still needs to be prove of a landlord-tenant relationship for the plaintiff to pursue claims under the Self-Storage Facility Act.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Melanie Crenshaw

Melanie Crenshaw is an Assistant Professor of Public Law and Government. She joined the School of Government in August 2022, working with magistrates in the area of civil law. Prior to joining the School, she was a magistrate in Cumberland County. Before serving as a magistrate, Crenshaw was in private practice in Greensboro, North Carolina.

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