As students across North Carolina head back to school, it is a good time to review the law that governs notifying schools about juvenile delinquency cases. Prior to raise the age, notification of charges for high school students required an understanding of the requirements under both the Juvenile Code for delinquency cases and the Criminal Code for cases in which students were accused of crimes committed at ages 16 and 17. Now,  under the post-raise the age statutory structure of juvenile jurisdiction, the Juvenile Code requirements will govern nearly all school notifications.

Here are the headlines:

• school notification can only be made by a juvenile court counselor to the school principal and under the specific circumstances outlined in the Juvenile Code, and
• the information disclosed must remain confidential and may only be used by the school in the limited way allowed for by the law.

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The clerk of superior court, as the ex officio judge of probate in North Carolina, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the appointment and removal of certain fiduciaries. See G.S. 7A-241. This includes the executor or administrator of a decedent’s estate (also known as the personal representative), the trustee of a trust, and a guardian of an incompetent adult or minor child’s estate. G.S. 28A-2-4(a)(2) (estate); G.S. 36C-2-203(a)(1) (trust); G.S. 35A-1203 (guardianship).  When determining whether to appoint or remove these fiduciaries, the clerk must determine whether the person applying to serve in that capacity is qualified to serve.  For example, a person may not serve as executor of an estate who is under the age of 18, who is a convicted felon whose rights have not been restored, or who is found to be otherwise unsuitable by the clerk. G.S. 28A-4-2(1), (3), (9).

G.S. 50-13.7(a) provides that “… an order … for the custody of a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested.” However, case law supplements this statute to provide that an order may be modified only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the original order, Savani v. Savani, 102 NC App 496 (2001), and the substantial change must affect the welfare of the minor child. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 NC 616 (1998); Shipman v. Shipman, 357 NC 471 (2003).

Readers are probably aware that the CDC Eviction Moratorium has been extended until July 31, accompanied for the first time by a statement that it is unlikely to be further extended. However, the Governor’s Executive Order 171 was not extended and so expired on June 30. I’ve received many questions from judicial officials and other occupants of Landlord-Tenant Land about what the law of summary ejectment looks like for July.  For a summary of both the CDC Order and EO 171, I encourage you to read my prior blog post, in which I discuss both orders separately. That post should be helpful in making clear what law continues to apply (i.e., the CDC Order) and what law is no longer in effect (i.e., EO 171). In this memo, I’m offering a few specific observations in response to the most frequent questions I’ve been getting.

Recently, in Kincheloe v. Kincheloe, _ N.C. App. _ (June 15, 2021), the North Carolina Court of Appeals engaged in a lengthy discussion of the law relating to the entry of orders that deviate from the Child Support Guidelines, giving me an excuse to post this short review of that law. To summarize at the beginning of my post rather than at the end, there are two key points to keep in mind when entering child support orders. First, any provision in an order that contradicts or is different than the specific terms or instructions in the Guidelines constitutes a deviation, and second, any deviation must be supported with detailed findings of fact regarding the reasonable needs of the children and the relative ability of the parents to pay support.    Continue Reading