In my last post, No Default Judgment in Contempt, I wrote about the requirement that all contempt orders contain the conclusion that respondent acted willfully when committing the act that is the basis for contempt. Of course, that conclusion must be supported by findings of fact, which in turn must be based on evidence.
So what findings are sufficient to support the required conclusion when contempt is based on the failure to pay money, such as child support?
By Guest Contributor, John Rubin*
Can the person protected by a DVPO be charged with violating the order?
Here’s a question I get occasionally: What language should I use to charge aiding and abetting a violation of a domestic violence protective order (DVPO)? Here’s a similar one: If someone is arrested for aiding and abetting a violation of a DVPO, is the person subject to the 48-hour pretrial release law for domestic violence offenses?
Even when contempt is based upon the failure to pay child support, the contempt order must contain the conclusion of law that respondent willfully violated the court order. That conclusion must be supported by findings of fact showing respondent actually has/had the ability to comply or to take reasonable steps to comply and deliberately failed to do so. Those findings of fact must be based on evidence.
In other words, a contempt order cannot be entered by default – a court cannot assume a respondent has the ability to comply simply because the respondent fails to prove he/she does not have the ability to comply.
*Note this post has been amended to reflect the December 2015 recodification of the SCRA
Earlier posts address the SCRA in family law actions and non-judicial foreclosures. It’s my turn to address the SCRA’s application to abuse, neglect, dependency (A/N/D), and termination of parental rights (TPR) actions.
When and Why Does the SCRA Apply?
The SCRA applies to any judicial or administrative proceeding, except for criminal proceedings. 50 U.S.C. § 3912(b). There is no exception for A/N/D or TPR actions, which are “child custody’ proceedings. G.S. 50A-102(4). Child custody proceedings are specifically referenced in the SCRA. 50 U.S.C. § 3931(a) and -3932(a). Continue Reading
*Note, since this post was published, North Carolina laws on statutory construction were amended. Effective July 12, 2017, the terms “husband and wife” and other terms suggesting a lawful marriage must be construed to include any two individuals who are then lawfully married to each other. See S.L. 2017-102, sec. 35 creating G.S. 12-3(16). This impacts the analysis of G.S. 49A-1, where it does apply to a mother and her spouse. For a further discussion, see New Legislation Acknowledges Same-Sex Marriage, posted by our colleague Cheryl Howell on Aug. 8, 2017.
Since our blog post, Same-Sex Marriage and Adoptions of a Minor by a Stepparent, we have received several inquiries about the role of a sperm donor in an adoption proceeding. Although General Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790 (W.D.N.C. 2014) and Fisher-Borne v. Smith, 14 F.Supp. 3d 695 (M.D.N.C. 2014) held NC’s ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional, they did not specifically address parentage when a child is conceived or born during a same-sex marriage. And, although artificial reproductive technology has advanced in the last 20 years, the laws in NC have not fully addressed these advances and how they impact parentage. Continue Reading
Last week, two bills were introduced in the NC House pertaining to adult guardianship* – H817 and H883. The first proposes the adoption of the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (UAGPPJA) by creating a new Chapter 35B. The second directs the Legislative Research Commission to study UAGPPJA and recommend whether NC should adopt the act.
So just what is UAGPPJA? (Pronounced, “You-Ah-Gap-Jah”)
Almost every equitable distribution case involves marital debt. And because there often is a significant amount of time between the date of separation – the point in time when the marital estate is created and valued – and the date the marital estate actually is distributed, most every case also involves post-separation changes in the amount owed on that marital debt. The amount either increases because neither party pays the bills and interest and finance charges accrue, or the amount decreases because one of the parties make payments. North Carolina law has struggled to determine the best way to address these changes in the distribution process.
*** Note, since this blog post was published, the General Assembly enacted S.L. 2015-58, which replaces SB 331. For more information, see this blog post on juvenile code reform legislation.
Subchapter II of the North Carolina Juvenile Code has seen few changes, since the Juvenile Code was rewritten in 1998. However, several bills are currently pending that suggest change may be coming. Some of these pending bills seek to clarify existing statutory procedures or create new procedures to provide guidance where the Juvenile Code is currently silent. However, two of the proposed changes are intended to reverse recent appellate court decisions interpreting the Juvenile Code. This list, although not exhaustive, describes pending bills that are likely to be of interest to juvenile court officials.
Chapter 50B expressly authorizes entry of consent DVPOs, GS 50B-1(c), and many cases are resolved in this way. Overall, this is a good thing because consent orders:
It is not uncommon for a defendant to be willing to agree to the entry of an order but not willing to agree that the specific acts alleged in the complaint actually occurred. Can a DVPO be entered without the specifics?
North Carolina law permits summary ejectment from residential housing only for reasons specified in the statute. G.S. 42-25.6. In Eastern Carolina Regional Housing Authority v. Lofton, 767 S.E.2d 63 (2014), the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided a case—and created new law – related to one of the most common grounds for summary ejectment: breach of a lease condition which, according to the lease itself, triggers the landlord’s right to declare the lease forfeited.