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Given the ever-increasing number of family law cases in the district courts, it is not surprising that questions frequently arise concerning the court’s authority to place limitations on the amount of court time allowed to individual cases. My former colleague Michael Crowell wrote a bulletin titled Time Limits several years ago thoroughly discussing the law addressing this question. Below are excerpts from his article. The entire bulletin can be found at https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/reports/aojb0902 pdf.

A minor injured through negligence or other wrongdoing may bring an action through a representative to recover damages for pain and suffering, permanent injury, and impairment of earning capacity. (A claim for reimbursement of the minor’s medical expenses typically belongs to the parents.) Although minors generally are legally incapable of binding themselves to contracts, the law allows a minor’s claims to be resolved through a settlement agreement. The settlement, however, is not enforceable against the minor unless it has first been investigated and approved by the court. Sigmund Sternberger Found., Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 677 (1968); Ballard v. Hunter, 12 N.C. App. 613, 619 (1971). Even if the settlement is arranged by a parent, guardian, guardian ad litem, estate administrator, or attorney, the minor cannot be bound absent prior court approval. Sell v. Hotchkiss, 264 N.C. 185, 191 (1965); In re Reynolds, 206 N.C. 276 (1934); Hagins v. Phipps, 1 N.C. App. 63 (1968). The rule applies not just to claims settled after an action is filed, but also to pre-litigation settlements including waivers of a minor’s right to sue. Creech v. Melnik, 147 N.C. App. 471, 475 (2001).

The purpose of the court’s review is to protect the interests of the minor. The investigation must focus on the minor’s welfare and fairness to the minor under the circumstances. See Redwine v. Clodfelter, 226 N.C. 366, 370 (1946) (minor’s welfare is the “guiding star”); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 578, 631−32 (1935) (affirming “fair, just, and equitable” settlement).

Update: Pursuant to Session Law 2025-75, the law in G.S. 29-19 was amended to remove the requirement under subsection (b)(2) that the father’s written acknowledgement must be “filed during his […]

It’s not hard to understand why every state in the United States offers its residents a small claims court. Small claims courts offer two advantages increasingly hard to come by in the court system: they’re cheap, and they’re fast. In 2009 the North Carolina General Assembly took steps to ensure that small claims cases aren’t decided too fast by enacting minimum notice requirements.  Prior to this legislation, a small claims defendant might be served Monday evening for a trial held Tuesday morning. The legislation enacted two separate amendments establishing different minimum notice requirements for (1) summary ejectment actions, and (2) all other small claims cases.  As we shall see, despite their differences, the guiding principles for magistrates implementing the legislation are the same for both types of lawsuits.

Post Written by Shea Denning

My daughter came home from elementary school last week with notecards seeking support for her nomination to serve as a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. I think that is it pure coincidence that her politicking coincided with the nationwide interest in potential nominees for the position following the death of Justice Antonin Scalia. But because I, like everyone else, had been thinking about how the vacancy on the court would be filled and by whom, her work got me thinking:  Who exactly can be a Supreme Court Justice?

In my most recent post, G.S. 42-3: The Landlord’s Life Preserver, I discussed summary ejectment based on the implied forfeiture provision set out in that statute. Confusion about when ejectment may be obtained on this ground, as distinguished from ejectment based on an explicit forfeiture provision in the lease itself, easily ranks #1 on my list of Most Common Summary Ejectment Errors. At the end of my previous post, I promised to next address tender as a defense to an action for summary ejectment. It comes as no surprise that the majority of North Carolina appellate cases involving tender present this same error in a different context. As is so often true in navigating the law of summary ejectment, correct identification of the ground for relief is the first step that renders subsequent steps simple. As we shall see, it is only when the landlord is reaching for the G.S. 42-3 life preserver that tender has potential application to the case.

Nearly five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided J.D.B. v. North Carolina, a case arising from the police interrogation of a middle school student in Chapel Hill. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that police officers must consider a juvenile’s age when determining whether they must read juveniles their Miranda rights before questioning them. The ruling represents a major shift in Miranda jurisprudence by establishing a different standard for evaluating police interrogations of juveniles – the reasonable child standard. In the years since J.D.B., however, lower courts have not clearly defined how the reasonable child standard impacts the assessment of whether a juvenile was “in custody.” The application of this new standard also raises questions about how North Carolina courts evaluate custody determinations in the school setting. These and other issues are addressed in detail in “Applying the Reasonable Child Standard to Juvenile Interrogations After J.D.B. v. North Carolina” (No. 2016/01).

In the recent case of Nicks v. Nicks, 774 SE2d 365 (NC App 2015), husband transferred property acquired during the marriage to an LLC and the LLC thereafter was transferred to a trust. All of this occurred before the date of separation. Understandably, the trial judge in the equitable distribution action filed after the parties separated felt that the property transferred to the LLC should be classified as marital property and distributed between the spouses, so the trial court classified the LLC itself as marital property and distributed it the husband as his share of the marital estate. The court of appeals vacated the ED judgment and remanded the case to the trial court after concluding the LLC was not marital property because it was not owned by either or both spouses on the date of separation.

Does this mean a spouse can avoid ED simply by transferring ownership of property to an LLC or other third party before the date of separation, or by allowing family members or others to hold legal title to property acquired with marital funds during the marriage?

READ POST "Equitable Distribution: When Marital Property is Not Owned by a Party…… (February 17, 2016)"

The equitable distribution statutes only give trial courts the authority to distribute marital property. This means equitable distribution is all about – and only about – identifying property owned by either or both spouses on the date of separation and determining how it should be distributed between those two people.

Marital property may include ownership interests in businesses and corporations. Just as parties can own stock in a traditional C corporation, parties also can own an LLC or an interest in an LLC. And just as a court would not be required to join, for example, Exon Corporation or Google before distributing stock owned by the parties, a court is not required to join an LLC in an ED case if the court simply distributes the marital ownership interest in the LLC between the parties.

READ POST "Equitable Distribution: When does the marital LLC have to be joined as a party? (February 12, 2016)"

North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 59 permits a trial judge to order a “new trial” for a number of reasons, including prejudicial irregularity, jury misconduct, newly-discovered evidence, insufficient evidence […]