On the Civil Side

A UNC School of Government Blog

https://civil.sog.unc.edu

  • Hope Someone Remembered to File the Motion to Modify……..

    This entry was contributed by Cheryl Howell on April 8, 2016 at 5:00 am and is filed under Family Law.

    ***UPDATE TO POST MAY 2, 2016: On April 26, 2016, the NC Supreme Court granted a temporary stay of the Court of Appeals ruling in the case discussed in this post. See SC docket #152P16-1.

    ***UPDATE TO POST OCTOBER 2, 2017: On September 29, 2017, the NC Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals discussed in this post. See Catawba County ex rel. Rackley v. Loggins.

     

    On Tuesday this week, the court of appeals held that a consent order modifying an existing child support order was void because no motion to modify was filed before the consent modification was entered by the court. In Catawba County ex. rel. Rackley v. Loggins, (NC App, April 5, 2016), the court held that GS 50-13.7 clearly requires that a motion in the cause requesting modification be filed in order to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court to enter any further orders in the support case. Without the motion, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to act.

    Unfortunately, it is not uncommon in North Carolina for orders to be entered modifying existing custody and support orders without anyone actually filing a motion to modify. This practice is especially common when all parties in the case agree to the modification. The court of appeals now has made it clear that this practice of ignoring required procedure results in invalid, unenforceable orders.

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  • Appeal Deadlines and Tolling under Rule 3(c)(2): Don’t Be So Sure!

    This entry was contributed by Ann Anderson on April 6, 2016 at 5:00 am and is filed under Appeals, Civil Practice, Civil Procedure-General, Jurisdiction.

    Even if you don’t know much about North Carolina’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, you probably know this:  There’s a 30-day time frame in which to appeal a civil judgment, and this deadline is jurisdictional—an untimely notice of appeal “mandates dismissal” of the appeal.  E.g., Bailey v. State, 353 N.C. 142, 156 (2000).  In other words, Thou Shalt Not Miss Thy Appeal Deadline.  Naturally, then, a would-be appellant needs to know when the 30-day appeal period begins and ends.

    The general time requirement is set out in Rule 3(c)(1), which makes clear that the notice of appeal must be filed and served within 30 days after entry of judgment as long as “the party has been served with a copy of the judgment within the three-day period prescribed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.”  (Served pursuant to Rule 5 within three days of entry of judgment.)  Under Rule 3(c)(2), however, when the party is not served within that three day period, the notice of appeal must be filed and served within 30 days “after service upon the party of a copy of the judgment.”

    By the plain language of Rule 3(c)(2), a party not served within three days would be led to think that its 30-day appeal clock starts when service is made.  Not so fast.  In a series of fairly recent opinions, the Court of Appeals has held that, if the appellant had some sort of actual notice of the judgment during those three days after its entry, Rule 3(c)(2) does not apply.  If there was actual notice, the 30 days instead began to run upon entry of judgment.  Here, in brief, are the opinions: Continue Reading

  • Retroactive Child Support: What is it and how is the amount determined?

    This entry was contributed by Cheryl Howell on April 1, 2016 at 5:00 am and is filed under Family Law.

    Prospective child support is the support ordered to be paid for the support of the child in the future. However, the court of appeals has held that all orders for prospective support must be effective as of the date the complaint seeking support was filed unless the trial court makes specific finding of fact to support ‘deviating’ from the general rule. Ex. rel. Miller v. Hinton, 147 NC App 700 (2001). This means that prospective support generally includes amounts ordered for a period of time before the support order is entered, but only that time period between the date of the filing of the complaint and the time of the entry of the child support order. And of course, GS 50-13.4 provides that the amount of prospective support generally is determined by application of the child support guidelines.

    But what about orders for support for a period of time before a complaint or motion for support is filed?

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  • You Have a Right to Appeal My Incompetency?

    This entry was contributed by Meredith Smith on March 30, 2016 at 3:43 pm and is filed under Guardianship.

    ** UPDATE: On October 4, 2016, the N.C. Court of Appeals published a decision, In re Dippel, in which the court applied G.S. 35A-1115 and G.S. 1-301.2 to hold that an aggrieved party has the right to appeal from the clerk’s order dismissing an incompetency proceeding. In that case, the court determined that the petitioner was an aggrieved party and could appeal from the clerk’s order. However, the court did not provide any analysis as to how the petitioner is aggrieved by the clerk’s order dismissing the incompetency proceeding pertaining to the respondent’s competency. The opinion therefore provides limited guidance going forward as to whether a person that is entitled to notice and is not the petitioner has a right to appeal the clerk’s order dismissing the incompetency proceeding as an aggrieved party. **

     

    Bob and Mary have been married for 60 years.  They live at home together but recently Mary’s health has started to decline significantly.  Due to a concern over Mary’s ability to care for herself, a friend of Mary’s makes a report to the county department of social services (DSS).   After an investigation, DSS decides to file a petition to adjudicate Mary incompetent and an application to have a guardian appointed on her behalf.   DSS sends notice of the proceeding to both Bob and Jane, their daughter, as Mary’s next of kin.   After a hearing, the clerk of superior court finds that Mary is incompetent and appoints Jane as her general guardian.

    Bob comes to you as his attorney and states that he wants to appeal the clerk’s decision.  Does he have standing to appeal? Continue Reading

  • Legitimation versus Paternity: What’s the Difference?

    This entry was contributed by Sara DePasquale on March 23, 2016 at 9:59 am and is filed under Child Welfare Law.

    *This post was updated on 10/24/16 to add citations for district court jurisdiction of paternity actions

    Earlier this month, my colleague, Meredith Smith, posted about Intestate Succession Rights and Children Born Out of Wedlock. Her post was prompted by In re Estate of Williams, ___ N.C. App. ___ (March 1, 2016), which addressed the application of G.S. 29-19(b) when determining whether the decedent’s child was an heir entitled to intestate succession. What caught my attention in the opinion were excerpts from both the orders of the clerk and the superior court  that referred to the process of legitimating a child pursuant to G.S. 29-19(b)(1) and (3). However, G.S. 29-19(b) addresses paternity, not legitimation. Legitimation for purposes of intestate succession is addressed in G.S. 29-18 (father and mother) and G.S. 29-19(a) (mother). So what is the difference? Continue Reading

  • Child Custody: Denying or Significantly Limiting a Parent’s Visitation

    This entry was contributed by Cheryl Howell on March 18, 2016 at 5:00 am and is filed under Family Law.

    In a recent blog post, I wrote about newly enacted legislation stating it is the public policy of North Carolina that custody determinations made pursuant to Chapter 50 of the General Statutes should encourage and supports a child’s relationship with both parents. Kids Need Both Parents When Possible. But in a decision published this week, the court of appeals upheld a trial court order limiting a father to supervised visits with his children every other Sunday for two hours. Meadows v. Meadows, NC App (March 15, 2016).

    Such limited access certainly doesn’t sound like the type of ‘equitable’ sharing of parenting rights and responsibilities encouraged by the new legislation.

    So when is it appropriate for a court to limit a parent’s access to his child in such an extreme way?

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  • What the Interstate Compact Rules Say About Out-of-State Runaways

    This entry was contributed by LaToya Powell on March 16, 2016 at 1:58 pm and is filed under Juvenile Law.

    When a juvenile runs from North Carolina to another state or to North Carolina from another state, interstate procedures apply to facilitate the juvenile’s safe return to his or her home state. Recently, law enforcement officials in multiple North Carolina counties have encountered out-of-state runaways and yesterday, this topic appeared on one of the School of Government monitored listservs. So, it seems like a good time to review what the Interstate Compact for Juveniles says about the legal process for returning these children to their homes. Continue Reading

  • Time Limits in Family Law Cases

    This entry was contributed by Cheryl Howell on March 11, 2016 at 5:00 am and is filed under Civil Practice, Family Law.

    Given the ever-increasing number of family law cases in the district courts, it is not surprising that questions frequently arise concerning the court’s authority to place limitations on the amount of court time allowed to individual cases. My former colleague Michael Crowell wrote a bulletin titled Time Limits several years ago thoroughly discussing the law addressing this question. Below are excerpts from his article. The entire bulletin can be found at https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/reports/aojb0902 pdf.

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  • Court Approval of Minor Settlements in North Carolina

    This entry was contributed by Ann Anderson on March 9, 2016 at 5:00 am and is filed under Civil Law, Civil Practice, Civil Procedure-General, Judicial Authority, Jurisdiction.

    A minor injured through negligence or other wrongdoing may bring an action through a representative to recover damages for pain and suffering, permanent injury, and impairment of earning capacity. (A claim for reimbursement of the minor’s medical expenses typically belongs to the parents.) Although minors generally are legally incapable of binding themselves to contracts, the law allows a minor’s claims to be resolved through a settlement agreement. The settlement, however, is not enforceable against the minor unless it has first been investigated and approved by the court. Sigmund Sternberger Found., Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 677 (1968); Ballard v. Hunter, 12 N.C. App. 613, 619 (1971). Even if the settlement is arranged by a parent, guardian, guardian ad litem, estate administrator, or attorney, the minor cannot be bound absent prior court approval. Sell v. Hotchkiss, 264 N.C. 185, 191 (1965); In re Reynolds, 206 N.C. 276 (1934); Hagins v. Phipps, 1 N.C. App. 63 (1968). The rule applies not just to claims settled after an action is filed, but also to pre-litigation settlements including waivers of a minor’s right to sue. Creech v. Melnik, 147 N.C. App. 471, 475 (2001).

    The purpose of the court’s review is to protect the interests of the minor. The investigation must focus on the minor’s welfare and fairness to the minor under the circumstances. See Redwine v. Clodfelter, 226 N.C. 366, 370 (1946) (minor’s welfare is the “guiding star”); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 578, 631−32 (1935) (affirming “fair, just, and equitable” settlement). Continue Reading

  • Intestate Succession Rights and Children Born Out of Wedlock

    This entry was contributed by Meredith Smith on March 4, 2016 at 2:25 pm and is filed under Estates.

    Update: Pursuant to Session Law 2025-75, the law in G.S. 29-19 was amended to remove the requirement under subsection (b)(2) that the father’s written acknowledgement must be “filed during his own lifetime and the child’s lifetime in the office of the clerk of superior court of the county where either he or the child resides.” The acknowledgement does not have to be filed with the clerk to establish intestate succession rights under G.S. 29-19(b)(2).  This change is effective December 1, 2025 and applies to the estates of decedents dying on or after that date.  

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