In a prior post, I talked about Eastern Carolina Regional Housing Authority v. Lofton, 767 S.E.2d 63 (2014), a North Carolina Court of Appeals case requiring a landlord seeking summary ejectment based on breach of a lease condition to prove as an essential element of the case “that summarily ejecting [the] defendant would not be unconscionable.” Last week the North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed in a long-awaited opinion, making clear that “the equitable defense of unconscionability is not a consideration in summary ejectment proceedings.” In so doing, the Supreme Court finally put the issue to rest, reconciling inconsistent statements of the law in several Court of Appeals cases, including Lincoln Terrace Associates v. Kelly, Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming, 123 N.C. App. 511 (1996), and Durham Hosiery v. Morris. Today, NC law provides that in an action for summary ejectment based on breach of a lease condition, it is sufficient for a landlord to demonstrate that the tenant breached the lease in a manner triggering the right to declare a forfeiture; the landlord has no additional burden to demonstrate that the result of such forfeiture will not be unconscionable.  The Lofton opinion, written by Justice Newby, is significant for another reason: the Court also addressed the relative roles of a public housing authority (PHA) and a trial court in a summary ejectment action based on criminal activity in violation of the lease.

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“We are not criminal defense lawyers. We are civil rights lawyers because being a criminal defense lawyer is kind of limiting”. (Alex Charns, Attorney, Annual Contractor and Assigned Counsel Training, UNC School of Government June 2016).

Considering all the many issues clients present with, referring to ourselves as only a specific type of attorney, such as a juvenile or family law attorney, does seem limiting. Representing people in any area of law requires more of attorneys, especially as they begin to address the multitude of social, health, and economic challenges their clients face.

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On May 15, 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court granted due process rights to children in the landmark case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The case involved 15-year-old Gerald Gault, who was taken into police custody without notice to his parents, held for four days, and committed to a juvenile facility for a maximum of six years for making a prank phone call to his neighbor. He received no prior notice of the charges and was adjudicated delinquent following an informal hearing with a judge without any witnesses or representation by counsel. His case would spark outrage today but was the norm for juvenile proceedings at the time. When the Supreme Court reversed Gault’s adjudication, it transformed the nature of juvenile court by defining basic requirements of due process that now apply to all delinquency hearings. These rights include:

• the right to notice of the charges;
• the right to an attorney;
• the right to remain silent; and
• the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

While this decision marked a watershed moment in children’s rights, the language of the Court was not absolute. The Supreme Court did not extend these rights to all juveniles. Gault applies only to juveniles whose adjudication of delinquency may result in commitment to a state institution, which excludes undisciplined juveniles. The Court also limited its holding to the adjudicatory stage, leaving states open to define due process in other stages of juvenile proceedings (i.e., pre-adjudication, disposition, and post-disposition). Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. As a result, the decision did not completely change the legal landscape but left a legal patchwork among state jurisdictions that continues today. This post is the first in a series of posts that will discuss Gault’s impact on juvenile delinquency proceedings in NC and whether Gault’s promise of due process rights for children has been fully achieved.

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Lawyers typically don’t litigate (nor judges adjudicate) for very long in North Carolina without confronting Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  This rule allows a trial court to “relieve a party…from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for a number of reasons based in equity. The reasons are divided into six categories:

• Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
• Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
• Fraud…, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
• The judgment is void;
• The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
• Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

Unlike Rule 50 (JNOV) and 59 (new trial) motions, which must be made within 10 days after judgment, Rule 60(b) motions may be filed up to one year from the order (or, for the last three categories, potentially even later), as long as the timing is reasonable. There will be occasions when the moving party can be heard by the same judge who issued the order.  But often the passage of time can make this difficult: The judge may be presiding in a different district or may be ill, on leave, or no longer on the bench.  It’s not surprising, then, that fairly often my colleagues and I are asked:  May a judge other than the original judge hear and rule on a Rule 60(b) motion? Continue Reading

**UPDATE: Effective July 21, 2017, Session Law 2017-158 expands the clerk’s civil contempt authority. The clerk now has the authority to exercise civil contempt in any instance when the clerk has original subject matter jurisdiction and issued the order that is the basis for the civil contempt in addition to any instance where a statute expressly provides for the clerk’s civil contempt authority.  See S.L. 2017-158, Sec. 11.**