G.S. Chapter 35A authorizes the clerk of court to appoint a general guardian or guardian of the person for a child who has no natural guardian. A biological or adoptive parent is a natural guardian of a child, so these guardianships are an option only for children whose parents are both deceased or parental rights have been terminated (either both parents’ rights have been terminated, or one parent is deceased and the other parent’s rights have been terminated). See G.S. 35A-1224(a). However, orphaned children also are often the subject of Chapter 50 custody actions. What happens if a child is the subject of both proceedings? Can both move forward or does one preclude or take priority over the other? In Corbett v. Lynch, (Dec. 20, 2016), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the appointment of a general guardian or guardian of the person renders pending issues of Chapter 50 custody moot. In supporting its holding, the court indicates that a Chapter 35A guardianship creates a relationship between the child and the guardian that is more comprehensive than a relationship between a child and a custodian designated pursuant to Chapter 50.

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The North Carolina Court of Appeals issued an opinion last week that may – or may not–have some implications for residential leases in North Carolina. At the very least, RME Management, LLC, v. Chapel H.O.M. Associates, LLC (filed 1/17/2017) makes me think I should give a longer answer when a small claims magistrate asks me a particular question about summary ejectment law. But more on that later. First, let’s take a look at RME.

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Last month, I was listening to hosts on a radio station discuss the fires in Tennessee that caused the loss of 14 lives and damage or destruction to more than 1,700 buildings. They were shocked to learn that two teenagers are alleged to have started these fires. The hosts discussed the many stupid things they did when they were teenagers. They shared how they did not consider the consequences of their actions before engaging in such risky behaviors. One host said he once set something on fire in the woods. Although the fire didn’t cause any damage or harm, he never considered that the fire could get out of hand. Another host stated that she could not excuse the teenagers. She could understand if they were eight or nine years of age, but she believes teenagers know exactly what they are doing. At what age should a teenager be held criminally responsible for misconduct that constitutes a crime? North Carolina lawmakers are currently debating this question.

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*Since the post was published, S.L. 2017-161 added G.S. 7B-200(a)(5a), which provides the district court with exclusive, original jurisdiction over a G.S. 7B-910.1 review. Additionally, a technical correction was made to G.S. 7B-910.1.

The new year brings Foster Care 18-21 to North Carolina. This is a new program that offers extended foster care to children who have aged out from foster care. Foster Care 18-21 was created by S.L. 2015-241, Section 12C.9 and became effective on January 1st. The North Carolina Division of Social Services provides additional information about this new program in its Child Welfare Services Policy Manual, Section 1201, XII (“NC DSS §1201, XII”). Continue Reading

Just like other organizations, churches can sue and be sued.  Much of the time religious doctrine is not relevant to the dispute, such as when a contractor does a shoddy job building the sanctuary, when the church’s neighbor contests a boundary, or when the church’s van gets into a collision.  But sometimes disputes can hinge on, or at least involve, the organization’s beliefs, principles, creeds, or canons.  Usually that happens in internal disagreements—actions among the church and its members, officers, directors, or leaders; or between an individual assembly and the larger organizing body.  In such cases, the authority of secular courts to decide the outcome is sharply limited by the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Analyzing a church’s internal property dispute, the U.S. Supreme Court stated decades ago that

[F]irst Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.

Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).

When such conflicts arise in North Carolina civil actions, our courts must ask the following: May the court resolve the dispute using only neutral principles of law?  If so, the First Amendment does not prohibit the court from exercising jurisdiction.  If, instead, deciding the issue would entangle the court in ecclesiastical matters, the court must decline to intervene.  See Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 274 (2007).  “The dispositive question is whether resolution of the legal claim requires the court to determine or weigh church doctrine.” Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 494 (1998).

North Carolina’s appellate courts have not, of course, had the opportunity to subject every type of internal church dispute to this test.  But there are plenty of examples of how it applies—many quite recent—and these are some of the key conclusions: Continue Reading