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[This post is co-authored with my colleague, Margaret Henderson]. It was originally posted on the Coates’ Canons: NC Local Government Law blog on March 29, 2018 but is relevant to readers of On the Civil Side as well.

In 2017, the North Carolina General Assembly established the Social Services Regional Supervision and Collaboration Working Group (SSWG) and directed it to develop recommendations related to the social services system (see legislative summary here). The legislation directed the UNC School of Government to convene the group, facilitate the meetings, and provide staff support to the project.

The SSWG’s work is divided into two stages. The group just released the final report for Stage One and is scheduled to present its recommendations to the legislature on April 10, 2018. Stage Two will get underway in May. All of the meeting materials, minutes, and recordings are available online.

There have been quite a few different conversations about social services system reform over the last year or so. As a result, there has been some confusion about the role of the SSWG. This blog post is intended to shed some light on the group’s charge and connect some dots between the work of the SSWG and other elements of system reform that are underway.

Mary signs a power of attorney (POA) appointing her son, Frank, as her agent authorized to act on her behalf.  The POA is acknowledged by a notary public and states that the agent has the authority to do all acts that the principal could do.  The POA is effective immediately and durable by default under the new North Carolina Uniform Power of Attorney Act (NCPOAA) effective January 1, 2018.   S.L. 2017-153 (S569) (not applicable to health care POAs or consent to health care for a minor under G.S. Chapter 32A).

Months later, Mary suffers a massive stroke and is no longer able to manage her property or business affairs because she is unable to make or communicate decisions.  Frank retrieves the original POA from Mary’s safe and takes it to the bank and attempts to withdraw money from Mary’s checking account to pay some of her bills.  The bank refuses to accept the POA and conduct the transaction.  A friend of Frank’s notes he had a similar problem with his father’s POA.  He had to ultimately seek court-ordered guardianship of his father to be able to conduct the necessary transactions on his father’s behalf because of the bank’s refusal to accept the POA.   Is Frank stuck because of the bank’s refusal?  Must he obtain guardianship to be able to carry out his duties under the POA on behalf of Mary?

Small claims magistrates don’t see many lawsuits filed by individuals alleging injury from unfair or deceptive acts (hereinafter, UTP[1]) by persons with whom they’ve done business — but they should. A primary purpose of GS 75-1.1, the relevant statute, is to provide a remedy for consumers injured by unethical or improper behavior in the marketplace, even when the dollar amount of the injury suffered is relatively small. Proving a right to relief under GS 75-1.1, unlike many consumer protection statutes, is simplicity itself, often requiring an injured plaintiff to do little more than relate his story in a clear and persuasive manner. Compared to small claims cases requiring magistrates to interpret and apply multiple statutes in the light of often complicated case law, the straightforward legal principles applicable to UTP cases make them ideal for determination in small claims court. In this blog post, I’ll take a quick look at some of the common procedural issues related to this claim in small claims court, review the general legal principles governing these actions, and briefly discuss case law involving GS 75-1.1 in the context of residential lease agreements.

READ POST "Fairness in the Marketplace Matters in Small Claims Court (March 26, 2018)"

Earlier this month the North Carolina Supreme Court issued its opinion in King v. Albemarle Hospital Authority, holding that a GAL appointment starts the running of the statute of limitations […]

The following post was written by Daniel Spiegel, a North Carolina Assistant Appellate Defender. It addresses the legality of a purge condition frequently imposed in civil contempt orders entered in child support enforcement proceedings across North Carolina.

This is a very important topic. Please share your thoughts and reactions.

READ POST "Civil Contempt and “Springing” Orders for Arrest (March 7, 2018)"

NOTE: Since this post was published, S.L. 2018-86 was enacted effective for all initial disposition orders that are effective on or after June 25, 2018. G.S. 7B-901(c) has been amended to add the word “determines” and supersedes the holding of In re G.T., ___ N.C. App. ___, 791 S.E.2d 274 (2016), aff’d per curiam, 370 N.C. 387 (2017). 2018 legislative summaries impacting child welfare are discussed here.

Abuse, neglect, or dependency court proceedings have several different stages, one of which is the dispositional stage. The dispositional stage, which occurs only after a child has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent, has several different types of hearings: initial, review, and permanency planning. During the various dispositional hearings, a court may address reunification efforts, which involve the diligent use of preventive or reunification services by a DSS when a child’s remaining in or returning to the home of a parent is consistent with achieving a safe permanent home for the child within a reasonable period of time. See G.S. 7B-101(18). How a trial court may address reunification efforts, including whether to relieve DSS from making those efforts, differs depending on the type of dispositional hearing. That is what the reunification efforts shuffle is all about.

I recently taught in a course for clerks on proceedings involving minors.   One of the sessions related to proceedings to establish facts of birth set forth in G.S. 130A-106 and G.S. 130A-107.  Both proceedings are discussed in more detail in Chapter 141 of the NC Clerk of Superior Court Procedures Manual.  The session was included on the course agenda in part to highlight the areas where clerks have jurisdiction to enter judgments and orders related to facts of birth and where clerks do not.   The two proceedings set forth in G.S. 130A before the clerk provide a mechanism for a person born in NC, whether an adult or a minor, who does not have a recorded birth certificate (G.S. 130A-106) or has unknown parentage and unknown place and date of birth (i.e. the person was abandoned at birth) (G.S. 130A-107) to obtain a judgment from the clerk establishing facts of birth.   If the clerk enters a judgment, the clerk then (i) certifies the judgment to the State Registrar, a person appointed by the Secretary of NC Department of Health and Human Services to run NC Vital Records, and (ii) sends a copy to the local register of deeds.

These proceedings are different from a proceeding where a person has a birth certificate and wants to change information on the existing birth certificate.  Essentially, the person is seeking to obtain an amended birth certificate because information on the birth certificate is incorrect or new information is known such as the person’s parentage. People often end up in the clerk’s office seeking an order to amend a birth certificate because they have been told by Vital Records in Raleigh or a local register of deeds that a court order is needed for the State Registrar to amend the birth certificate.

Small claims magistrates know that the small claims statutes are filled with rules about time limits. For example, small claims cases must be calendared for trial within 30 days of the complaint being filed, but summary ejectment actions must be calendared within seven (excluding weekends and holidays). A defendant must be served no later than five days before trial in all small claims actions other than summary ejectment, which requires only a two-day notice. The list goes on. Magistrates often ask about how to calculate these various time periods and the purpose of this post is to provide information about that often confusing task.

Friday night I had the privilege of joining a dinner to honor four retiring (or recently retired) superior court judges who have devoted many years of extraordinary service to the […]