Recent blog posts - 38 of 69

In 2014 the story of a California family and a live-in nanny who refused to leave after her employment ended made international news –- including Dr. Phil! According to media accounts, the parties agreed that the nanny would provide childcare and light housekeeping in exchange for room and board. An argument ensued as to whether the nanny was performing her duties as originally agreed, and her employment was terminated. When the nanny retired to her bedroom rather than vacating the property, the situation deteriorated further. Law enforcement refused to intervene, saying the dispute was “a civil matter.” Eventually the nanny voluntarily moved out. One media account  commented, “Even though the nanny is gone, [one of the family members] says she still casts a long dark shadow in her home, saying, ‘As far as I see it, she’s, in a way, like a vampire and she hasn’t yet drained us.’”  

READ POST "When the Nanny Won’t Leave: NC Law on When Employees are Tenants (November 18, 2018)"

To end the week, I’ll point out three recent Court of Appeals opinions that remind us that a Rule 59 (“new trial”) motion will not toll an appeal period if the motion does not actually seek proper Rule 59 relief.  If, for example, the motion does not provide proper notice of the grounds for relief, or if it is being used merely as a general “motion for reconsideration,” it may not be considered “proper.”  As I’ve discussed in previous posts (here and here), North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 59 permits a trial judge to order a new trial (or, through Rule 59(e), amendment of judgment) for a number of reasons, including prejudicial irregularity, jury misconduct, newly-discovered evidence, insufficient evidence to justify the verdict, prejudicial error of law, and other bases.  A proper Rule 59 motion tolls the period for appeal of the underlying judgment. N.C. R. App. P. 3(c)(3); G.S. 1-279.1.  But if a court determines that Rule 59 was not the appropriate vehicle for remedy sought, the appeal period will not have been tolled. These three recent published opinions are our newest examples of this outcome:

GS 50-13.3 provides that an order for custody is enforced by civil contempt and its disobedience is punished by criminal contempt. This statute mirrors case law regarding contempt; civil contempt is to force present compliance with an order and criminal contempt is to punish a past failure to comply and to discourage future noncompliance.

This distinction between civil and criminal contempt has been described by appellate courts as “murky at best,” and recent cases from the North Carolina Court of Appeals illustrate that contempt can be particularly difficult to apply correctly in custody cases. Most importantly however, these cases indicate that civil contempt probably is not an appropriate remedy for the most common enforcement issues that arise in custody cases.

I am planning two conferences for civil defenders that will be held at the School of Government (SOG). The Guardianship Proceedings for Appointed Counsel conference is scheduled for January 24, 2019 and the Civil Commitment Conference is the following day on January 25, 2019. Currently they are held bi-annually in odd years.

READ POST "Upcoming Trainings for Civil Defenders (October 24, 2018)"

When the General Assembly enacted S.L. 2017-41 (H 630) in June 2017, it set several wheels in motion related to reform of the social services system (See legislation; SOG summary). Some of the ideas addressed in the reform conversation involve “regions” or inter-county collaborations. These ideas are often referred to as “regionalization,” but that term is simply too broad to be helpful. There are at least four distinct “regional” conversations underway, and they really need to be differentiated. My goal today is to abandon the term “regionalization” and clarify terminology for these social services reform conversations moving forward.  To that end, this blog post will review the reform ideas related to regional social services work, give them unique names, and provide a brief update on the progress of these conversations.

More than 200 district court judges from districts across North Carolina convened last week for their semiannual conference. Much of the continuing education agenda was dedicated to informing judges about […]

Child custody orders can be modified upon a showing that there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child(ren) since the entry of the last custody order and upon a showing that modification is in the best interest of the child(ren). GS 50-13.7; Shipman v. Shipman, 357 NC 471 (2003). Three relatively recent opinions from the court of appeals clarify that the required substantial change does not necessarily need to be the development or occurrence of a new circumstance; the required substantial change can be a change in the way an existing circumstance impacts the welfare of the child(ren).

READ POST "Custody Modification: the effects of the same circumstances can be the changed circumstances (September 27, 2018)"

I’m excited to introduce Jacqui Greene, the School’s new Assistant Professor of Public Law and Government specializing in juvenile justice law. Jacqui relocated with her family from Albany, New York on August 19^th and started with the School the very next day. I sat down with Jacqui and interviewed her for this post as a way for you to meet her.

Small claims magistrates are by now thoroughly familiar with GS Ch. 42, Art. 5, the Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA). Claims arising under the Act are routinely raised and determined in small claims court. Even so, there are a few aspects of the Act about which I often receive questions.

Spend a fall Friday in Chapel Hill with us for practical legal education and 6.25 hours of live CLE.  Civil and criminal updates, Supreme Court case review, a land use […]