One of the more common questions I receive about the transfer of a case from juvenile jurisdiction to the jurisdiction of the superior court for trial as an adult is whether transfer can be ordered based on consent of the juvenile. The issue seems to cross my desk when a juvenile has some charges pending in criminal court and there are unrelated felony charges pending under juvenile jurisdiction. The short answer is no. The statutory structure that governs transfer does not allow for ordering transfer based on consent. Why? Continue Reading

We have Chapter 50B authorizing civil domestic violence protective orders to protect victims of domestic violence and Chapter 50C authorizing civil no-contact orders to protect victims of sexual misconduct and stalking who do not have the personal relationship with the perpetrator required for a 50B DVPO. In 2015, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 50D authorizing permanent, non-expiring civil no-contact orders to provide additional protection to victims of sexual violence. Effective August 1, 2023, Chapter 50D was expanded to authorize permanent protection for victims of human trafficking.

The Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) governs a state’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear child custody cases, including abuse, neglect, dependency (A/N/D), and termination of parent rights (TPR). See G.S. 50A-102(4); 50A-106. Without following the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJEA, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Any orders entered when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction are void ab initio. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588 (2006). I receive numerous inquiries about the UCCJEA in A/N/D cases. A common question involves North Carolina’s use of temporary emergency jurisdiction and whether it ever becomes initial custody jurisdiction when North Carolina becomes the juvenile’s “home state” after the A/N/D petition has been filed in district court. Earlier this month, the court of appeals answered this question when it published In re N.B., ___ N.C. App. ___ (July 5, 2023). This blog serves as a follow up to my previous blog post about temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Continue Reading

The drug xylazine has been in the news recently as a dangerous substance commonly mixed with heroin, fentanyl, and other drugs. Xylazine is not an opioid nor is it currently a controlled substance, which presents unique challenges for legal and public health professionals. This post, co-written by SOG faculty members Kirsten Leloudis and Phil Dixon, examines the legal and public health issues surrounding the drug.

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was enacted by Congress in 1978 and applies to designated “child custody proceedings” that involve an “Indian child.” An Indian child is a person who is under 18 years old and is either (1) a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe or (2) eligible for membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe and a biological child of a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe. 25 U.S.C. 1903(4). There are four types of child custody proceedings that are governed by ICWA: (1) foster care placements, (2) preadoptive placements, (3) termination of parental rights (TPR), and (4) adoptions.

The purpose of ICWA is to set minimal federal standards for four types of child custody proceedings that involve the removal and placement of Indian children. Through ICWA, Congress sought to address “an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families that are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies.” 25 U.S.C. 1901(4). ICWA encompasses a national policy of protecting the best interests of Indian children and promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families. 25 U.S.C. 1902. ICWA has many provisions that apply to abuse, neglect, dependency; TPR; guardianship of minors; and adoptions of minors (including stepparent adoptions) when an Indian child is involved. (For more information about ICWA and its requirements, see Chapter 13, section 13.2 of the A/N/D-TPR Manual here.)

In 2019, ICWA was challenged as and held to be unconstitutional because it exceeded federal authority, infringed on state sovereignty, and discriminated on race. That federal district court opinion was appealed and ultimately heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. Last Thursday, in a 7-2 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected every challenge made by the petitioners in Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. ___ (2023) and held that ICWA is constitutional. This opinion has two concurrences and two dissents, all of which are discussed below. Continue Reading