The North Carolina Court of Appeals has issued opinions recently that address two important issues relating to Chapter 50B DVPOs, the effect of repeated continuances of an ex parte order on the duration of the final DVPO, and the additional findings required when the trial court enters “mutual” DVPOs.

 Effect of continuances of ex parte orders on the duration of the final DVPO

 In Hays v. Lewis, ___ N.C. App. ___ (January 7, 2026), the trial court entered an ex parte DVPO against defendant on March 8, 2024, effective until March 15, 2024, when a hearing on plaintiff’s complaint was originally scheduled. On March 15, 2024, and on three separate occasions after that date, the trial court continued the hearing on plaintiff’s request for a final DVPO and ordered that the ex parte order remain in effect, keeping the ex parte in effect until June 6, 2024, when the court conducted the trial on the merits of plaintiff’s claim. The trial court concluded defendant had committed an act of domestic violence against plaintiff and entered a DVPO against defendant effective until June 6, 2025. Defendant appealed.

On appeal, defendant argued that G.S. 50B-3(b) prohibited the trial court from entering an order effective through June 6, 2025, because the original ex parte issued by the court was effective March 8, 2024, more than one year before the expiration of the final DVPO. G.S. 50B-3(b) states that “[p]rotective orders entered pursuant to this Chapter shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year,” and defendant contended that this one-year time limitation includes any time during which an ex parte order is in effect.

The court of appeals disagreed with defendant’s interpretation of G.S. 50B-3(b). Citing what it described as “the plain meaning” of the statute, the appellate court held that G.S. 50B-3(b) requires that the one year begin upon the “issuance of a DVPO entered after notice and an opportunity to be heard and does not include the time encompassed by an ex parte DVPO.”

The court of appeals reaffirmed that ex parte orders and DVPOs are distinct. A DVPO entered after notice and an opportunity to be heard is not merely an extension of an existing ex parte DVPO. G.S. 50B-2(c)(5) explicitly addresses time limitations imposed on ex parte DVPOs and states that continuances “shall be limited to one extension of no more than 10 days unless all parties consent or good cause is shown.” The legislature purposefully designed these provisions to protect defendants from prolonged ex parte orders and addressed them separately from G.S. 50B-3(b). The one-year limitation in G.S. 50B-3(b) is distinct from the statutory provisions relating to ex parte orders.

Remember Rudder v. Rudder?

In Rudder v. Rudder, 234 N.C. App. 173 (2014), the court of appeals held that the trial court lost jurisdiction to enter a final DVPO when an ex parte DVPO that had been in effect for more than one year was allowed to expire before the trial court held the trial on the merits of plaintiff’s claim. Defendant in Hays argued that the opinion in Rudder supports his argument that a trial court loses jurisdiction to enter further orders when an ex parte DVPO has been continued in effect for more than one year because of the one-year time limitation in G.S. 50B-3(b). The court of appeals disagreed with defendant’s interpretation of the Rudder opinion, stating:

“The ruling in Rudder does not suggest the time limitations of a DVPO entered after notice and an opportunity to be heard should incorporate a previously issued ex parte DVPO.  In fact, the Rudder opinion consistently referred to a DVPO entered after notice and an opportunity to be heard as a “one-year DVPO.”  234 N.C. App. 173, 759 S.E.2d 321.  And contrary to Defendant’s contention, the Rudder opinion contemplates that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2 “addresses the procedure and time limitations for ex parte or temporary orders, while the substantive protective provisions of any type of protective order are addressed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3, and the time limitations of the one-year DVPO are addressed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B3(b).”  Id. at 183, 759 S.E.2d at 328 (emphasis added).  The Rudder Court declined to hold that ex parte DVPOs necessarily expire after one year when repeatedly continued.  Id. at 184, 759 S.E.2d at 329 (“Even if we assume, without deciding, that an ex parte DVPO may lawfully continue for more than a year through the mechanism of repeated continuances, in this case, the ex parte DVPO ultimately expired . . . when no order was entered continuing the ex parte DVPO in effect after that date.”).  Defendant’s reliance on Rudder is therefore misguided.”

Mutual Protective Orders: additional required findings of fact

 In Shuler v. Donahue, ___ N.C. App. ___ (November 5, 2025), plaintiff sought a DVPO against defendant, and defendant filed a counterclaim seeking a DVPO against plaintiff. The trial court ultimately entered two orders: one DVPO against defendant (using AOC-CV-306), and one DVPO against plaintiff (not using AOC-CV-306). Each order granted essentially the same protections to each party against the other. Plaintiff appealed the order entered against her. Defendant did not appeal. On appeal, in addition to other things, plaintiff argued that the trial court did not make sufficient findings to support entry of a “mutual DVPO” pursuant to G.S. 50B-3(b).

G.S. 50B-3(b) states:

“Protective orders entered, including consent orders, shall not be mutual in nature except where both parties file a claim and the court makes detailed findings of fact indicating that both parties acted as aggressors, that neither party acted primarily in self-defense, and that the right of each party to due process is preserved.”

The court of appeals in Shuler ultimately agreed with plaintiff.  Because G.S. 50B-3(b) references but does not define “mutual” DVPOs, the court of appeals used the word’s “ordinary meaning” and concluded that when read together the two DVPOs in this case constituted mutual orders because each party asserted a claim against the other, the claims were heard on the same date, and the trial court granted reciprocal protections to each party. Therefore, the court of appeals held that the trial court was required by G.S. 50B-3(b) to make “detailed findings of fact indicating that both parties acted as aggressors” and “neither party acted primarily in self-defense.” The statute’s requirements that both parties assert a claim, and that the due process rights of each party were preserved were satisfied.

The court of appeals recognized that the relevant AOC form (AOC-CV-306) does not include the findings required for mutual DVPOs. Even so, G.S. 50B-3(b) makes such findings mandatory and the case was remanded to the trial court for further findings. The appellate court noted that if the trial court is unable to make the required findings for mutual DVPOs, it may not be able to grant defendant’s request for a DVPO against plaintiff, even though her conduct did constitute an act of domestic violence.