G.S. 50B-3(b) provides that, if requested to do so before a current domestic violence protective order (DVPO) expires, the trial court can renew the order for good cause for an additional fixed term, not to exceed two years, even if the current order has previously been renewed. All provisions in the protective order can be renewed, except temporary custody provisions cannot exceed one year in total duration. G.S. 50B-3(a1)(4). While a plaintiff must be a resident of North Carolina to request a DVPO, GS 50B-2, the plaintiff does not need to continue to reside in North Carolina to request that the DVPO be renewed. Comstock v. Comstock, 244 N.C. App. 20 (2015).
My first post on the topic of the renewal of a DVPO entered pursuant to Chapter 50B was in 2015: https://civil.sog.unc.edu/renewal-of-a-dvpo/ Since that post in 2015, there has been a statutory amendment to the renewal provision in Chapter 50B and there have been several appellate opinions addressing the good cause that must be found to support renewal of an order.
First the statutory amendment.
“[T]he only jurisdictional requirement contained within [G.S.] 50B-3(b) is that a party seeking the renewal of a DVPO file such a motion before the expiration of the existing order.” Jabari v. Jabari, 283 N.C. App. 513, 523 (2022) (quoting Comstock v. Comstock, 244 N.C. App. 20 (2015)).
There is no requirement that the hearing on the request for renewal occur before the expiration of the current order. Comstock.
What if a violation occurs after the motion to renew is filed and after the term of the DVPO expires but before the court grants the motion to renew? Is there a violation of a valid DVPO punishable by contempt or as a crime?
All DVPOs are required to be for a fixed term, so every DVPO will expire by its own terms. The statute does not provide for the automatic extension of an order when a motion to renew is pending so absent some action by the court, the DVPO will not remain in effect after expiration and before renewal.
The General Assembly addressed this issue in S.L. 2022-48. That legislation amended GS 50B-3(b) to clarify that the court is authorized to temporarily renew a protective order that will expire after the filing of the motion to renew and before the hearing on the motion to renew. The amended statute provides that when a motion to renew a protective order has been timely filed but the hearing on the motion to renew is scheduled for a time after the expiration of the existing DVPO, the court may temporarily renew the DVPO upon the ex parte request of a party for a fixed period of time not to extend beyond the date of the renewal hearing or 30 days from the date the current order is set to expire, whichever occurs first. The court can extend the order further upon the express written consent of both parties or their attorneys. The temporary renewal cannot extend a temporary award of custody beyond the maximum one-year period.
Good Cause
An order renewing a DVPO must contain findings of fact to support the conclusion that good cause exists to renew the DVPO. Ponder v. Ponder, 247 NC App 301 (2016)(renewal order which incorporated the original DVPO but did not contain any new findings of fact to support the conclusion that good cause existed was void ab initio). But cf. Jabari v. Jabari, 283 NC App 513 (2022)(a renewal order was not void where the trial court failed to check the box on the preprinted AOC form order concluding there was good cause to renew the DVPO where the parties consented to the renewal of the order and the order contained a finding of fact that plaintiff continued to fear the defendant).
A new act of domestic violence is not required for the renewal of a DVPO, G.S. 50B-3(b), and the facts supporting the entry of the original DVPO may be sufficient to support the conclusion of good cause to renew, Forehand v. Forehand, 238 NC App 270 (2014)(findings in the renewal order that were based on conduct supporting original DVPO along with the finding that plaintiff remained in fear of defendant were sufficient to support the renewal order), but only if the court makes new findings at the time of the renewal order that those original findings support the conclusion of good cause to renew. Ponder (simply incorporating the original DVPO without making new findings of fact was insufficient to support the renewal order).
In a recent opinion issued on February 5, 2025, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s conclusion that good cause existed to renew a DVPO, holding there was insufficient evidence presented at the renewal hearing to support the conclusion. The original DVPO in that case was entered by consent and contained no findings of fact. The allegations in the complaint requesting the DVPO did not allege the defendant attempted to cause bodily injury or caused bodily injury, but rather alleged defendant’s conduct placed G.E.M., defendant’s teenaged child, in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or continued harassment. Citing Comstock and Jabari, the court of appeals in Martin stated that “[p]er prior North Carolina appellate case law, a showing of good cause [to renew the DVPO] requires plaintiff to demonstrate the minor child’s continued, legitimate fear of defendant.”
To support the conclusion that there was good cause to renew the DVPO, the trial court made findings that mirrored the findings of fact made in the original ex parte DVPO entered in the case. Those findings of fact were based on allegations contained in the complaint. In addition, the renewal order contained the findings that the “minor child testified that she remains in fear of defendant”, the “minor child testified that she remains in fear of seeing the Defendant out in public for fear of what he might do or say to her,” and the “minor child testified that she remains afraid of receiving physical harm at the hands of defendant.”
On appeal, defendant argued there was not competent evidence introduced at the renewal hearing to support the findings of fact and argued that plaintiff failed to show good cause to renew the DVPO. The court of appeals agreed, concluding that there was no evidence introduced at the hearing to support the findings based on the contents of the ex parte order, and concluding that the trial court findings established that the minor child testified about her fear but failed to find that the trial court believed the child was in fear. Noting that a showing of subjective fear, rather than a showing of an objectively reasonable fear, is required for the issuance of a DVPO, the court of appeals held that a trial court’s findings must show that the court believed the plaintiff had an actual fear of the defendant. The mere fact that the child testified that she feared the defendant was insufficient to establish the child’s legitimate, subjective fear.
The court of appeals also held that the child’s testimony was “vague” and not “adequate to support a finding that she had a legitimate fear of defendant.” The child did not testify that she was in fear of the defendant for any of the reasons alleged in the original complaint, included in the ex parte DVPO, or alleged in the motion to renew the DVPO. Instead, she testified that she was “afraid he is going to convince me to come back or he’s going to be sorry or something – he’s best at manipulating,” and that she was afraid he would “listen in on my conversations on my technology and he would, get in my business on technology and stuff.” When asked if she feared physical harm, she admitted that defendant had never physically hurt her before but that she was “scared that he’s going to get mad at me for doing this and I’m scared he’s going to hurt me or something.”
The court of appeals does not directly address the question of what a plaintiff needs to fear to establish a legitimate fear, but the court does cite GS 50B-1 as support for its statement that “a DVPO is appropriate in situations where a person attempts to cause bodily injury or intentionally causes bodily injury, or places one in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or continued harassment.” This indicates that a renewal must be supported with findings of fact indicating that the plaintiff has an actual fear that the defendant will commit or continue to commit an act of domestic violence.