• Domestic Violence Criminal Law and Procedure

    Written by School of Government faculty member John Rubin

    In getting ready for the North Carolina magistrates’ fall conference and a session that I’m teaching on issuing process in domestic violence cases, I began thinking about the ways that North Carolina criminal law addresses domestic violence. The North Carolina General Assembly has made numerous changes and additions in this area of criminal law, collected below. If I omitted some part of North Carolina criminal law involving domestic violence cases, please let me know.

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  • Equitable Distribution: The Marital Property Presumption

    Immediately following the definition of marital property in G.S. 50-20(b)(1), the statute states “[i]t is presumed that all property acquired after the date of marriage and before the date of separation is marital property except property which is separate property under subdivision (2) of this subsection.” This presumption probably is the most important core principle of classification of property in North Carolina equitable distribution because it defines the burdens of proof. Continue Reading

  • Court of Appeals holds that “heart balm” claims are not facially unconstitutional

    North Carolina is among only a handful of states still recognizing the civil claims of alienation of affection and criminal conversation.  Known as the twin “heart balm” torts, these laws were devised long ago when women were regarded as a type of property and private morals were regular court business.  In short, these claims allow a person to sue his or her spouse’s paramour for money damages.  To prove “alienation of affection,” a plaintiff must show that the defendant wrongfully alienated and destroyed the genuine love and affection that existed between plaintiff and spouse.  (Although lovers typically are the target of these suits, a defendant could be another third person who has set out to create the rift.)  To prove criminal conversation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff’s spouse in North Carolina during the marriage (but before separation).

    In the other states that have not yet swept them into the dustbin of history, these claims do not often make their way to court.  North Carolina appears to be one of only a couple of states in which they are filed regularly and sometimes result in substantial settlements and large verdicts. Continue Reading

  • Judicial Relief under the New GS Chapter 32C, the North Carolina Uniform Power of Attorney Act

    On July 20, 2017, Governor Cooper signed Session Law 2017-153 (S569) known as the North Carolina Uniform Power of Attorney Act (NCPOAA).  This new law goes into effect on January 1, 2018 and applies to powers of attorney (POA) in North Carolina.  It repeals provisions in GS Chapter 32A that pertain primarily to financial POAs, including the statutory short form POA in Article 1 and the enforcement provisions in Article 5.  It creates a new GS Chapter 32C.  It does not apply to POAs that grant authority to a person to make health care decisions for another person.  Article 3, health care POAs, and Article 4, consent to health care for a minor, under GS Chapter 32A continue to apply and are mostly unaffected by the NCPOAA.

    The NCPOAA adopts, in large part, the Uniform Power of Attorney Act published by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC).  In both the uniform law and the NCPOAA, there are sections on judicial relief.  As noted by the ULC, the purpose of this judicial relief is two-fold: (i) to protect vulnerable or incapacitated persons who grant authority to another under a POA against financial abuse, and (ii) to protect the self-determination rights of the principal.  Uniform Power of Attorney Act, Comment, Sec. 116.

    The judicial relief provisions as adopted in NC are heavily modified from the uniform law.  This is due in part to the fact that the judicial relief provisions under the NCPOAA specifically list proceedings that may be brought under the act and allocate jurisdiction over those proceedings between the clerk, who serves as the ex officio judge of probate in NC, and the superior or district court.  The distribution of jurisdiction under the NCPOAA among these judicial officials mirrors estate proceedings under GS 28A-2-4.  There are proceedings that are exclusively within the clerk’s jurisdiction, ones that are initiated before the clerk but may be transferred by a party to superior court, and then finally proceedings that are excluded from the clerk’s jurisdiction.  The NCPOAA also sets forth the procedures, standing, venue, and appeal rights for these proceedings.

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  • “Raise the Age” Is Now the Law in North Carolina

    North Carolina is no longer the only state in the U.S. that automatically prosecutes juveniles as adults beginning at age 16. In June, the General Assembly ended a century long practice of prosecuting teens as adults by enacting the Juvenile Justice Reinvestment Act as part of the 2017 state budget, which raised the age of criminal responsibility to 18. As a result, most 16 and 17-year-olds will be prosecuted in juvenile court beginning December 1, 2019. There are, however, some exceptions. Here’s what you should know about this historic reform. Continue Reading

  • Right to Counsel in Civil Contempt Proceeding for Violation of Custody Order

    When a court is considering whether to hold a party in civil contempt for the failure to comply with provisions in a child custody order, must the court inform that parent that he has the right to a court-appointed attorney if he wants an attorney and is unable to afford one?

    The court of appeals recently held that the answer to that question must be determined on a “case-by-case basis” with appointed counsel being required only “where assistance of counsel is necessary for the adequate presentation of the merits, or to otherwise insure fundamental fairness.”

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  • A Lease is a Contract

    Summary ejectment law is a complicated, confusing mishmash of modern-day consumer protection legislation, centuries-old property law, and plain old contract law, Getting in too deeply can lead to a person starting to throw around phrases like livery of seisin (a very old term from feudal England that basically required the old landowner to hand the new landowner a piece of dirt).  That slip into madness is not required. While there’s nothing intuitive about livery of seisin, we’ve all understood contract law since childhood. My six-year-old son once traded his 3-year-old sister two stuffed animals for lifetime rights in “the good chair.” In the complicated world of summary ejectment law, sometimes it’s useful to remember a simple truth: a lease is a contract. So let’s think about what we all know about contracts, and then apply that knowledge to leases. Continue Reading

  • Gag order? Punishment for talking about a case? Can a court do that?

    In an earlier post about high-profile trials, I touched on a trial judge’s authority to restrict photos, audio, video, and broadcast of all or parts of an open court proceeding.  To sum it up, the court has broad discretion to restrict dissemination of the proceedings in order to protect the integrity of the process. And under the right circumstances someone who violates the court’s directive can be punished.

    But what about another high-profile trial issue:  When may a judge prevent people from reporting on or talking publicly about the case?  Or punish a person for doing so? Continue Reading

  • DVPOs for Same-Sex Dating Relationships?

    This post is also published on the NC Criminal Law blog. 

    Domestic violence protective orders (DVPOs) are available to “persons of the opposite sex who are . . . or have been in a dating relationship,” and who are able to establish that the person that they are or were dating committed an act of domestic violence against them. Persons of the same sex who are or were in a dating relationship don’t have the same opportunity. Is that constitutional? The Supreme Court of South Carolina just addressed a related question, and its opinion suggests that the answer is no. Continue Reading

  • Local Government Lawyers: Take Care Asserting Governmental Immunity

    When a city, county, or other unit of local government is sued for negligence or other torts, it’s common practice for the unit’s attorney to file a motion asking the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit based on the defense of governmental immunity. (See blog posts available here and here for an explanation of governmental immunity fundamentals.)  Many local government attorneys believe that, if the trial court denies such a motion, the unit always has the right to an immediate appeal.  As a recent decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals reminds us, however, whether the unit may immediately appeal can depend on how the immunity defense is framed in the motion.  This blog post aims to

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