In my last post, I wrote about the marital property presumption and the significance of that presumption in the classification of marital property. Divisible property is not marital property, so the marital property presumption does not apply to help with the classification of property, value or debt acquired after the date of separation. So when there is evidence that marital property has increased in value between separation and the ED trial, does one party have to prove the cause of the increase before the court can distribute the increased value? Or, when one party has received income from a marital asset, like a rental house or an LLC, does one party have to prove that the income was not received as the result of the actions of a party before the court can divide the income between the parties?

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*SINCE THIS POST WAS PUBLISHED, THE N.C. SUPREME COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DISCUSSED BELOW. A new blog post discussing the NC Supreme Court decision can be read here.

Earlier this year, the North Carolina Court of Appeals published In re A.P., 800 S.E.2d 77 (2017), which held that the county DSS that had an open child protective case did not have standing to file a neglect and dependency petition. As a result, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action, and the adjudication and disposition orders were vacated. Since In re A.P. was decided, there are lots of questions about when a county DSS has standing to file an abuse, neglect, or dependency (A/N/D) petition and what happens in conflict of interest cases requiring a case to be transferred to a different county DSS. Continue Reading

Immediately following the definition of marital property in G.S. 50-20(b)(1), the statute states “[i]t is presumed that all property acquired after the date of marriage and before the date of separation is marital property except property which is separate property under subdivision (2) of this subsection.” This presumption probably is the most important core principle of classification of property in North Carolina equitable distribution because it defines the burdens of proof. Continue Reading

On July 20, 2017, Governor Cooper signed Session Law 2017-153 (S569) known as the North Carolina Uniform Power of Attorney Act (NCPOAA).  This new law goes into effect on January 1, 2018 and applies to powers of attorney (POA) in North Carolina.  It repeals provisions in GS Chapter 32A that pertain primarily to financial POAs, including the statutory short form POA in Article 1 and the enforcement provisions in Article 5.  It creates a new GS Chapter 32C.  It does not apply to POAs that grant authority to a person to make health care decisions for another person.  Article 3, health care POAs, and Article 4, consent to health care for a minor, under GS Chapter 32A continue to apply and are mostly unaffected by the NCPOAA.

The NCPOAA adopts, in large part, the Uniform Power of Attorney Act published by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC).  In both the uniform law and the NCPOAA, there are sections on judicial relief.  As noted by the ULC, the purpose of this judicial relief is two-fold: (i) to protect vulnerable or incapacitated persons who grant authority to another under a POA against financial abuse, and (ii) to protect the self-determination rights of the principal.  Uniform Power of Attorney Act, Comment, Sec. 116.

The judicial relief provisions as adopted in NC are heavily modified from the uniform law.  This is due in part to the fact that the judicial relief provisions under the NCPOAA specifically list proceedings that may be brought under the act and allocate jurisdiction over those proceedings between the clerk, who serves as the ex officio judge of probate in NC, and the superior or district court.  The distribution of jurisdiction under the NCPOAA among these judicial officials mirrors estate proceedings under GS 28A-2-4.  There are proceedings that are exclusively within the clerk’s jurisdiction, ones that are initiated before the clerk but may be transferred by a party to superior court, and then finally proceedings that are excluded from the clerk’s jurisdiction.  The NCPOAA also sets forth the procedures, standing, venue, and appeal rights for these proceedings.

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When a court is considering whether to hold a party in civil contempt for the failure to comply with provisions in a child custody order, must the court inform that parent that he has the right to a court-appointed attorney if he wants an attorney and is unable to afford one?

The court of appeals recently held that the answer to that question must be determined on a “case-by-case basis” with appointed counsel being required only “where assistance of counsel is necessary for the adequate presentation of the merits, or to otherwise insure fundamental fairness.”

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